AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF
PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Inquiry

Offprint from Volume 14 – 1971
REVIEW DISCUSSIONS:

I. THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF HUSSERL'S LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS*

Findlay's translation of the Logical Investigations appears seventy years after the first German publication of Volume One. The three generations of continental philosophy framed by these two events were so permeated by Husserl's influence that no one can doubt his frequent assertion that the Investigations were a breakthrough into a new philosophical era. The three generations moreover were not just chronological measures; there were three philosophical periods as well: the time of Husserl's own predominance, the arrival and influence of Heidegger in the late 1920s and in the 1930s, and the postwar existential form of phenomenology. The phenomenological movement is presently experiencing a return to its origins in Husserl. Many technical studies of his philosophy have appeared in the last decade, and the Husserliana marked its twentieth birthday in 1970.

The rash of translations of Husserl into English during the last ten years shows that phenomenology's reflection on its origins will be an Anglo-Saxon as well as a continental concern. There is a paradox in this, for twentieth-century English and American philosophy developed with practically no explicit relationship to Husserl's phenomenology. Now Findlay's translation provides an English version for the only hitherto untranslated phenomenological book published by Husserl himself. The last in English was the first in German; perhaps Anglo-Saxon thought will find phenomenology through a reverse hermeneutic as a substitute for earlier affiliaction. But current interest in Husserl does not have just archiological promise; having engendered one rich philosophical era with Heidegger steering and amplifying the momentum initiated by Husserl, the phenomenological movement may be ready to begin again, to see where it can move without the immediate presence and domination of Heidegger, even though he will always remain a distant parameter of interpretation. If Heidegger was as alien to phenomenology as Husserl claimed, perhaps the return to Husserl is a second journey to find the historical function phenomenology might have had under its own force. With the decline of existential phenomenology, there has also been a sharper awareness of the logical and formal elements in Husserl's philosophy, and his affinity to and influence upon logic and the philosophy of language. Perhaps these themes, somewhat obscured by the direction phenomenology has taken in the past five decades,

II

The Logical Investigations seem to be a loosely connected series of studies. The appearance of disconnection is illusory and has two causes: Husserl goes into such exhaustive detail in examining aspects of his main themes that the identity of the theme itself can easily be forgotten; and he sometimes circuitously approaches his own position through examination and correction of other opinions, many of which are now less known and of minor importance. It is as though Kant had included all his debates with contemporaries in the Critique of Pure Reason. Husserl's later works have much less of this; they sharply emphasize major themes and show little explicit concern with confronting all alternatives, but they can afford this near luxury precisely because the Investigations established the basic concepts of phenomenology and made room for them within contemporary thought. In the Investigations the tangled roots of phenomenology are still visible; Husserl's later works are the clean trunk and branches.

The Investigations are built around four major themes: distillation of ideal meanings from expressions; determination of the nature and structure of conscious acts; the problem of knowledge or of identity-synthesis; the logic of parts and wholes. Examining these will give focus to subordinate themes that cluster around each and will clarify the structure of the book. It will also help the metaphilosophical task of showing how each theme functions in the other three, for they are not developed discursively one after the other; they are different moments in the single crystallization of intelligibility that takes place in the Investigations. Separation of these four themes is a pedagogical device in the ABCs of reading Husserl philosophically. Finally, as a general fifth theme we will examine the Prolegomena.

(1) Husserl distills meanings as ideal entities by beginning with significant expressions like uttered sentences or words. He must first determine what kind of sign expressions are, so he can be clear about how meanings are to be isolated from them. He distinguishes 'indication' (Anzeige) from 'expression' (Ausdruck) as the two species of the genus 'sign' (Zeichen).

The following are examples of signs as indications: smoke as a sign of fire, an insignia as a sign of an army, a flag as a sign of a country, fossils as a sign of animals living during a certain age. The common element in indication is: we deal with two distinct realities, each of which could be experienced and asserted as real by itself (I can perceive the insignia, or perceive the army, each apart from the other; I can perceive the fossils, or I could have perceived the living animals); however the two are related to one another by the extrinsic relation of indication. Whether by conventional association or by natural causes, one is a sign for the other. My experience of the reality of one motivates me to believe in the reality of the other object indicated by the first. Sometimes instead of simple objects,
states of affairs serve as indications for other states of affairs. Here again indication simply means that our belief in the actuality of one state of affairs motivates our belief in the actuality of the other, and each could in principle be experienced apart from the other. Now how do expressions differ from indications?

In Husserl, 'expression' is taken as the sense-informed expression, the meaningful utterance: 'mere' or 'physical' or 'sensuous' expression refers to the residue left when the meaning is taken away, when the marks on paper or the spoken sounds or braille shapes are considered simply as physical objects, with at best only a marginal awareness that they can also function with meaning. What is expressed in expressions is meaning — not thoughts or mental experiences or personal dispositions, for these are only indicated by expressions. We can infer mental experiences from expressions the way we infer fire from smoke. But how do we get from expressions to meanings?

We don't get from one to the other at all. We already have meanings in expressions; that is what makes them more than mere physical objects. An expression, in its functioning as a sign, does not refer extrinsically to somethings entirely other than itself, the way an indication-sign does. What is expressed, the meaning, collapses into the expression; it is a part, a moment, of the expression. Even the etymological spelling, both in German and in English: an expression presses its meaning out of itself, it doesn't refer you to something else. And like a winepress, it presses only when its functions in the actuality of being expressive, not when it is drily stored away. That is, to anticipate somewhat, we cannot talk about expressions without also talking about the conscious 'acts' that make them expressive.

Husserl makes the following distinctions. (a) An expression can be considered as a transient utterance, a single event. (b) An expression can be considered as an ideal entity that returns again and again: the sentence that is repeated word for word. (c) The meaning is still another ideal entity, considered without regard for the particular expression it may inhabit. It is the expressible, the definable or the paraphrasable (since other sentences or words in the same language can be used to repeat it), or the translatable (for other languages can be used to bring it out again).

How has Husserl come to meanings as ideal entities? Not by private visions, as critics sometimes intimate, but by disclosing invariants in working expressions. A meaning is that which remains the same throughout the plurality of repetition, paraphrase, definition, or translation. The steps Husserl takes in the Investigation to reach meaning go through language; meaning is reached as the expressible in language. He will also say that we sometimes entertain meanings without explicit language, but this is a limit case and has its own sense only in derivation from linguistic meaning. If Husserl claimed private visions of meanings he could be refuted by the simple counter-claim that someone does not see these things. But if he discloses invariants in expressions, which are public realities at the start, we have a basis for agreement or disagreement upon the things themselves, and not a quarrel about what we see or don't see. All Husserl's talk about intuition of meanings simply says that through his philosophical discourse certain invariants are brought out after having been confusedly, obscurely, or ambiguously felt. Through his discourse we are made able to intend these invariants intuitively. Furthermore the invariants are not hypothetical constructs postulated to explain certain other phenomena; Husserl's phenomenological discourse makes them directly, intuitively present to consciousness.6

There is another structural invariant that must be distinguished. When expressions are used, they contain not only meaning but also reference to an object. Napoleon can be meant as the victor at Jena or as the vanquished at Waterloo; the same figure can be meant as an equilateral triangle or as an equiangular triangle. The same object can be referred to under different meanings. Alternatively the same meaning can be used with reference to different objects; 'dog' can refer to Fido or to Topper. The possibility of varying one while the other remains the same shows that meaning and object are not reducible to one another.6

The object of reference may be a single thing or a state of affairs, and it may be either real or fictitious. Wherever there is meaning, there is an object referred to; the two dimensions structurally complement one another. Finally, the object can be meant either explicitly or in intuitive presence, in an act of empty intention or in an act of fulfillment; but this suggests that to discuss objects of reference adequately, we must introduce the theme of conscious acts. Expressions and meanings alone are not enough as parameters.

(2) Acts of consciousness and the intuitions we are supposed to have of them are even more controversial subjects in phenomenology than meanings and intuitions of meanings. The notion of acts seems to bring back an outdated, introspective psychology that irrevocably dates Husserl's philosophy. But here again, Husserl does not appeal to introspective views; acts are disclosed by philosophical argument, not by claims of private seeing. They have a philosophical legitimacy quite independent of late nineteenth-century psychological theories.

Husserl treats acts explicitly and thoroughly in Investigation V, after having admitted their controversial status in the introduction. Chapters 3 to 6 study the structure of acts and relations among acts, while Chapter 1 examines two notions of consciousness that Husserl rejects. Chapter 2 develops his own notion of acts; but it is developed in function of Brentano, and Husserl's own doctrine appears first in #13. The nucleus of his theory of acts is found in #13–#19.

But long before this direct treatment of acts, Husserl uses them in Investigation I, conjointly with his study of expressions. In #9, after having focused on expressions and meaning, Husserl says:

If we seek a foothold in pure description, the concrete phenomenon of the sense-informed expression breaks up, on the one hand, into the physical phenomenon forming the physical part of the expression, and, on the other hand, into the acts which give it meaning and possibly all intuitive futilities, in their relation to an expressed object is constituted. In virtue of such acts, the expression is more than a merely sounded word...
The peg from which everything hangs is the sense-informed expression. It previously served to lead into meaning, it now leads into acts. Acts are what change a series of physical marks into significant expressions. Acts "give" meaning to expressions; not in the sense that acts first possess a full-fledged meaning and then externally find a sign for it in words, for this would make words indication-signs for meanings and not expressions. Rather the entire trio of act/meaning/expression is constituted simultaneously. Each becomes what it is together with the other two. But in this coming to be, acts are the agents. An act is the performance, the use, the exercise that activates the other two components. Expressions do not engender meanings, nor do meanings engender expressions. Acts constitute both, and in so doing they are constituted themselves, because they are nothing but such activations of meaning. And yet as phenomenologists we get a grip on acts through expressions, not by introspection. Once again it is not a matter of private visions but of disclosing a dimension that must be present when expressions exist in their charged state as expressions.

The immediate matrix for Husserl's term 'act' is nineteenth-century psychology, although his use of it differs from the psychological. Its phenomenological sense may be clarified if we go beyond psychology to the classical roots of the word. In Latin *actus* refers not to inner psychic occurrences but to public events. It means bodily movements, actions, performances (like the performance of a play or delivery of a speech), exploits, and also legal or official actions like making a law. In the last case, an *actus* is a law or other product 'achieved' by a governing body, and *actus* is the process of its being achieved. Now if we were to examine the *actus*, we would not do so "introspectively," by considering the process alone. The process is disclosed and is identified only in function of the law that it engenders. We could not focus on it as an act in any other way: the object 'first for us' is the law, even though the 'first in itself' is the legislating process that constitutes the law. Moreover if we were to determine parts of the process - its beginning and end, interruptions, first and second half; or legal moments like amendments, calling the question, speeches pro and con - the pieces and structure of the process could be named only in function of the law engendered or being engendered.

Now taking political realities as a philosophical magnification of individual men, an 'act of consciousness' is analogously dependent, for philosophical analysis, upon the meaningful expression it engenders. We know we have one act when we have a single deposit or achievement from it, a single expression. An act's unity is determined by the publicly available unity of its expression. Also we do not somehow inwardly see or feel an act beginning, going through its first half, or ending; what sort of feeling could that be? We are able to distinguish structural moments and pieces of acts, but we can do so only in function of the meaning it constitutes by showing the parts of the expressed meaning with which they are correlated or involved.

The other major kind of acts besides those that constitute expressions are acts of perception: seeing a tree, hearing thunder, smelling perfume, feeling velvet. Husserl approaches these acts by using the model of acts that constitute expressions, but the role of the physical, sensuous expression - the letters - is now assigned to sensations. Sensations undergo an "apprehension" which 'interprets' them as the presentation of a certain kind of thing, as the presentation of a tree or a piece of velvet. We are not merely undergoing sensations, we are perceiving an object with a certain sense. Thus an object-with-sensations is constituted by an act of consciousness on the basis of sensations, just as a meaning-with-object is constituted by a conscious act that animates an expression.

There are two major differences between perceptions and expressive acts: (1) When an expression is enlivened, nothing is yet done to bring the object meant, the house or the tree, into direct presence. We can still have only an empty, signifying meaning. But in perception the activation of sensations by an act does make the object directly present in the sensations. The object is intuited, it is given as directly as it can ever be given. (2) Sensations are not exactly like letters or syllables. Letters or syllables or marks, the sensuous expression, are themselves constituted as physical things. They have their own objectivity, and Husserl says a special act of consciousness is needed to constitute them. Then in addition to this level, a new act interprets the marks as expressions. For expressions therefore we need two distinct acts, the lower subordinated to the higher, meaning-constituting act. But sensations are not constituted as things by a distinct act. They are not objects over and against consciousness; they are merely something consciousness lives through as part of itself. The only act in perception is the act that constitutes the object-with-sensations on the basis of sensations.

Consider how Husserl's thought has moved. The paradigm was the self as the external indication-sign relationship between two things or two states of affairs, one the sign for the other. Expressions were introduced as derivations from indications; instead of two things, we now have one object (marks, physical words) enlivened in such a way as to express not a thing separate from itself but a meaning contained within the total expression. Finally in perception we eliminate the subsistence of the marks or physical expression, replacing them with sensations which also impress/present the object which is there in them. If sensuous marks express a meaning, we could well say that sensations imprese an object for consciousness. Indication-signs are a philosophical model for expressions, and expressions are a philosophical model for sensations in perception. The trend of thought is towards greater condensation and elimination of otherness. What were two distinct things in indication-signs collapse into a thing plus its sensible impression in perception; but even in this intense unity we still have a distinction between the thing and its actual sensible impression/sensation. They are two distinct moments that cannot be merged.

We can move this sequence one step further, to the point beyond which no further collapsing is possible. In the perception of an object, there is still a distinction between the object in its unity and the continuum of impressions or profiles it engenders. But in immanent experiencing, Husserl claims, this distinction is removed. When I undergo feeling, pain, or emotion, the process being experienced is the experiencing of the process. The identity of such a feeling is just the continuum itself, not a single entity...
manifesting itself throughout the continuum. There is no residual difference at all, not even one between appearances and the thing which appears. There is no vestige of the sign-object dichotomy which served as the starting point of this analysis. But this sheer experiencing of sensation is on a level of consciousness more primitive than, and presupposed by, the acts of perception we are now considering.

An act of perception is like an act of expressive meaning. Its being is only to make an object present in a series of impressions/sensations. It is a work, performance, or exercise (ergon) of consciousness which actuates a perceived thing as perceived. We mark off the unity of a perceptual act in function of the oneness of what is perceived, not by introspective feeling. Still, Husserl does describe the structure of acts, and the complexity of his analysis could make us think he is trying to give extensive information about what kind of pieces and relationships we find when we 'look' at acts. But we should not let the complexity of analysis — in #20-#21 of Chapter 2, and all of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of Investigation V — hide the simplicity of what he actually says. We must also remember that all these analyses speak of acts simply as correlatives to the objects they constitute. In this long section of Investigation V, essentially the following points are made:

(a) These dimensions of acts must be distinguished: quality (what kind a given act is, whether perception, imagination, memory, judging, commanding, etc.) and matter (what meaning-with-object or object-with-meaning is given in the act). These two components comprise what Husserl calls 'the essence' of the act. But every act is associated with conditions, which Husserl calls 'representatives' to stress their functional character of working with intentional acts and presenting an object in them. If we deal with perceptual acts, the impressions/representatives are those proper to the object and can be given only by the kind of thing we are perceiving. If we have an act of linguistic meaning, where we intend the object not as actually present but as absent, as only spoken about, the representatives are not the impress the object itself gives, but only 'symbolic' impressions. They are the representatives of letters, words, acoustic phenomena, and the like, which do not even typically present the object. Now the whole formed by act-quality, act-matter and representatives, is the complete concrete totality of an intentional experience. But in giving these three dimensions or moments, Husserl has not revealed any new secrets about the structure of acts. He has simply disclosed further invariants operative in intentional experience. The only reason there are three components is that each one of these dimensions can change while one or both of the other two remain the same. For instance, the same matter can be perceived or imagined, with different act-qualities in each case. But although the dimensions may vary in respect to one another, they can never be separated from the others. You cannot have an act-quality, matter, or a set of representatives by itself. They are what they are only with the others.

(b) Husserl distinguishes between nominal and propositional acts. A nominal act is one whose object is a single whole that can be given continuously, like a tree or house, whether perceived, imagined, remembered, or meant absent. A propositional act is one whose object is articulated into discrete parts, like a state of affairs or a relation or a fact. For instance I mean a house nominally when I simply perceive it or just name it. But if my consideration of the house turns, by virtue of further activity of consciousness, into a consideration of the state of affairs presented by the sentence, 'The house which is brown is on fire', I have a propositional act. A propositional act is one whose object and meaning involve syntax. Nominal and propositional acts are often called 'simple' and 'complex' respectively.

(c) Husserl distinguishes between founded and founding acts. A founded act is one which can be performed only on the condition of another act being executed with it. An act of aesthetic appreciation, he claims, can take place only upon an act of perception. An act of linguistic meaning can occur only upon the base of an act that constitutes the physical side of the expression. Founding acts are those which condition the founded ones. Since founding acts exist only for the founded ones, the aim of consciousness and the center of attention lie in the latter; Husserl says we 'live' in the founded acts.

All these distinctions — quality/matter/representatives; nominal/propensional; founded/founding — lead to the problem of objectifying acts, which in turn are used for the problem of identity-synthesis in consciousness, the problem of knowledge and truth. And speaking metaphysically, we must observe that all these distinctions really do not tell us anything new about acts and their objects; they only say more about what was already implied in the descriptions that established acts as intentional experiences in the first place. That is, Investigation V is a technical, systematic reworking of Investigation I. We are not given new information about the other side of the object, the way we obtained new information about the other side of the moon when the first pictures of it were taken. Furthermore, we have no contemplated acts in isolation from their objects; all the above distinctions speak of acts only as they constitute objects and meanings. So the result of Husserl's analysis is not that we have new data about acts, but that we can be more distinct, more accurate, less confused and vague, when we talk about consciousness and its objects.

(d) 'Objectifying acts' is the name given by Husserl to the most fundamental kind of intentional consciousness. His treatment of objectifying acts is preceded by a long and difficult section, Chapters 3 and 4, dealing with 'presentation'. A few remarks about this will not only help elucidate the text, but will also clarify the sense and importance of objectifying acts. We can find help in a passage from the Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein discusses Frege's idea that every assertion contains an assumption, which is the thing asserted. Wittgenstein goes on to say we should not posit such an 'assumption' (Annahme) distinct from the assertion: 'It is a mistake if one thinks that the assertion consists of two actions, entertaining and asserting...'. Husserl deals with much the same problem. He asks how a judgment (Wittgenstein's 'assertion') or any other kind of intention is to contain a 'presentation' ('assumption' in Wittgenstein) As Wittgenstein works against Frege, Husserl works against Brentano, specifically against Brentano's maxim that each intentional
experience is either a presentation or based upon underlying presentations.\(^{25}\)

There is, says Husserl, a wrong way of understanding this maxim: we might consider the presentation as a full-fledged act, to which we subsequently append other acts such as judging, ascertaining, willing, approving, desiring, perceiving, etc. In this view, the presentation is a separable entity, something that can exist by itself, but which also happens to enter into composition with other act-qualities. The presentation would be different from all other acts, however, because it lacked the distinction between quality and matter; it would be all quality or all matter.\(^{26}\) It would be ‘mere’ undifferentiated presentation, subsequently modified by the acts founded upon it.

Husserl’s own view is: presentation is indeed a full-fledged act, and it has both act-quality and act-matter. When I merely entertain a proposition, without committing myself to assert or deny, I am engaged in an intentional act. But when I finally assert what I had merely entertained, when I make a judgment, I do not add judging to what went before; rather my simple presentation changes into judgment. The act-qualities change, while the act-matter remains the same. However, since the act-matter is just a moment or aspect of the act, and not a separable piece that can exist in isolation, the transfer from presentation to judgment does not require the continued presence of a subsistent presentation within judgment, one that would make the judgment a combination of two pieces (Wittgenstein’s two acts, entertaining and ascertaining).

What we have said of judgment is true of all intentions. In a perception, for instance, we do not have two acts, a ‘presentation’ plus a ‘perception’.\(^{27}\) We have only the perception, within which there is a moment, the act-matter, which could present the same object and sense with another act-quality, such as memory or imagination.

Presentations are changed into judgments or perceptions, they are not included within them. The sameness between presentation and judgment is accounted for by a moment in each, the matter, which has no special affinity to either kind of act nor, indeed, to any other kind of intentional act. Brentano’s maxim is ambiguous therefore because it uses ‘presentation’ in two senses, once as a full-fledged act, and once as an act-matter. To formulate it correctly, we should say: every intentional experience is either a presentation (in the sense of a full-fledged act of presentation without ascert) or is based upon underlying presentations (in the sense of act-matters).\(^{28}\)

In Chapter 4, which is less confusing than the Chapter 3 we have just examined, Husserl distinguishes between intending a categorial object in a ‘many-rayed’ intentionality, as when we assert, ‘It has started to snow’, and intending the same state of affairs in one ray, when we say, ‘That it has started to snow is unfortunate’.\(^{29}\) The clause introduced by ‘that’ refers to the state of affairs; a complex intention is changed into a simple intention. Another example of ‘nominalizing’ complex objects is turning a predicate into an adjective: ‘The red balloon’ is a nominalized and simplified form of ‘The balloon is red’. Such nominalization allows us to build up higher levels and more complex categorial thinking. The theme of nominal and propositional (simple and complex) consciousness also refers to the problem of presentations, because it shows fundamental differences in how a single state of affairs can be presented to consciousness. Besides the single-rayed intentions that come from uniting many-rayed intentions, there are others that are simple from the start, such as those expressed by proper names or those operative in simple perception.\(^{30}\)

We have examined presentations under two aspects, each of which turns out to be subdivided into two alternatives: (A) as regards act-quality we have distinguished mere presentations, non-asserting or non-positing acts, and ascertaining, positing acts; (B) as regards act-matter we have distinguished nominal or simple acts, and propositional or complex acts. The genus that covers all four species is called ‘objectifying acts’ by Husserl.\(^{31}\) Concretely, the following combinations are possible: asserting/nominal, asserting/propositional, non-asserting/nominal, non-asserting/propositional. This quartet of objectifying acts is absolutely fundamental in intentional consciousness. No member is reducible to any other member, and all four are necessary to talk about what consciousness does. All kinds of intentional experience, such as imagining, remembering, making inferences, doing mathematics or physical experiments, etc., either involve some form of objectifying acts or are reducible to them.

Husserl’s purpose in developing objectifying acts lies deeper than mere description. He intends to use them to clarify what knowledge is, to show the difference between opinion and knowledge. For objectifying acts are the intentional experiences through which ‘identity’ becomes a phenomenon; through them and their interactions an object is allowed to appear ‘as itself’ and ‘as the same again’. Likewise objectifying acts are the sources of the failure of identity; they are the experiences in which ‘difference’ becomes a phenomenon. Husserl says, the unity of identification, and thereby all unity of knowing, has its place of origin in the sphere of objectifying acts... We can accordingly define objectifying acts as those whose synthetic forms of fulfillment have a character of identification, while their synthetic form of failure has a character of distinction.\(^{32}\)

Consciousness, intentional experience, is awareness of identities and differences of various types, so objectifying acts are the exercises in which consciousness does its most fundamental work, and in which it also constitutes itself for what it is; for a consciousness that has not yet recognized identities and differences has itself not yet come to be as intentional.

When Husserl starts discussing the role of objectifying acts, he introduces the difference between empty intentions and fulfillments. This duality is called the ‘fundamental division’ in the genus of objectifying acts.\(^{33}\) There is some discrepancy here, for this duality is not the same as the duality of positing versus non-positing acts. To clear up this difficulty would take too much space at present; let us move on to the problem of identity-synthesis and develop the notions of empty versus filled intentions along with it.\(^{34}\)
intention is chronologically succeeded by a fulfillment which saturates it. The static relationship, the 'lasting outcome' of the dynamic transition, is the simple state of recognition: when my friend comes into the room and I recognize him, there need not have been any prior anticipation of his coming. My perception is at once recognition, with the complex structure of an intention saturating an empty meaning, along with the experience of this saturation. The same would be true if someone asked, 'What color is this?' and I answered 'Beige.' Here the recognition would be of an instance of a universal, but it still would be the complex static, simultaneous experience of something given as something. Application of proper names is another example.

Since identity-synthesis occurs within objectifying acts, we must be able to account for it in both nominal and propositional acts. Husserl discusses the former in Investigation VI §41-§50, the latter in VI §61-§66.

Husserl uses a triple distinction to treat nominal fulfillments. There are (a) purely signitive intentions, (b) intentions of objects in image or picture or likeness, (c) intentions that present the thing itself, intuitions. The difference of intentionality is based primarily on differences in the kind of sensory content or impressions ('representatives') associated with each.

In signitive intentions, the sensations/impressions have no similarity at all with those given by the thing itself when it is present; in imaginative or pictorial intentions, the sensations/impressions are like those associated with the object itself; in objectless intuitions, the object is recognized as being merely similar and not the very ones given by the object itself; finally in intuitions we have sensations/impressions that could only be given by the object in its actual presence.

The clearest examples of signitive intentions are those associated with words, for the impression given by the words has no likeness with that given by the object meant in the words. In addition, any kind of indication-sign or symbol is also signitive. Examples of image or likeness intentions are imagination, photographs, phonograph recordings, paintings, imitations, or pictures, where, we might say, one can mark out portions of the imperssional/sensory field which would correspond to or be mapped upon correlative portions of the imperssional/sensory field presented by the object itself. Finally the impressions/ sensations made by the thing itself in direct perception are just those that are given by this thing, or this kind of thing, and no other. In the actual exercise of consciousness, these three pure forms are usually mixed with one another. Our experience blends signitive, imaginative and intuitive consciousness. Husserl speaks of the 'weight' of the intuitive or signitive 'substance' of a given act, which would depend on the proportion of intuitive or signitive impressions/sensations involved in the act.

In the case of perception, even the in-person presence of what is meant involves some absences. Because of the spatiality and temporality of physical objects, whenever we mean a thing intuitively and perceptually, we can only mean one part at a time and the intuitive presence of that part is accompanied by a signitive inteding of the other absent parts. In vision, for instance, when we see one side of a cube, the other sides are co-present, but meant as absent, in purely signitive intentions. In touch only one part of the surface can be felt at once, and the rest of the surface, as
well as the insides, can be meant only in absence. In hearing only one part of a melody is fully present, with clapsed and future parts co-meant as absent; likewise the sound is heard only from one vantage point, and all the other 'aspects' that other vantage points would provide are emptily co-meant.

The simple perception of all such nominally meant objects is a continuum, passing from one part to another, with constant awareness that we are perceiving the same thing through all these profiles.

All perceiving and imagining is, on our view, a web of partial intentions, fused together in the unity of a single total intention. The correlate of this last intention is the thing, while the correlate of its partial intentions are the thing's parts and aspects.

As the flow of impressions/sensations goes on, the same object is intuitively presented throughout. We experience the identity of the same cube as we look at all its sides successively. But this identity is not explicitly thematized as we live through it; we do not engender an act which is superimposed upon the continuous perceptual act and which constitutes the identity as its proper theme. The unification of these percepts into a continuous percept is not the performance of some peculiar act, through which a new consciousness of something objective is set up. Husserl adds, 'In our case an identification is performed, but no identity is meant.'

If we were to thematize the identity of the object, we would execute a categorical act and move into propositional consciousness.

There is no way for a physical object to be perceived except through such a continuum of profiles, and such perception is not just a Kantian phenomenon behind which the thing in itself remains concealed; the perception is the presence of the thing in the only kind of presence it can engender: a presence executed in a mixture of presences and absences. Furthermore, this profiling presence occurs not only in actual perception but also in imagination, where the imagined object also appears in a continuum of impressions.

Propositional acts differ from nominal ones in that the continuum of experience proper to nominal perceptions is broken up into discrete parts, and these parts are recognized as parts by the propositional consciousness.

It is clear that the apprehension of a moment and of a part generally as a part of the whole in question, and, in particular, the apprehension of a sensible feature as a feature, or of a sensible form as a form, point to acts which are all founded. This means that the sphere of 'sensibility' has been left, and that of 'understanding' entered.

We do not merely undergo the profiling presence of a cube, for instance; we explicitly distinguish parts. The new meaning of our consciousness is expressible in the sentence, 'The cube is blue', and the object meant in this case is not just the cube or the blueness, but the state of affairs that the cube is blue. A new act of consciousness is present here, which Husserl calls 'categorical', and it constitutes new meanings and new objects, 'categorical objects'.

A categorical object is a state of affairs like the fact that Paul is awake, or that John is next to Peter. It is possible to isolate from categorical objects the categorical forms operative in them, such as the attributive form $S$ is $p$ or the relational form $xRy$. Still further categorical forms can be built upon the basis of such first-level categorical forms or objects, like $(S$ is $p) \implies (S$ is not not-$p)$.

We are in the realm of formal systems. However, Husserl does not examine the problem of categorical identity-synthesis, or truth for the propositional consciousness, on the formal level; he treats it for formalized categorical objects like the facts that John is stout or that the cat is on the mat.

The problem of an identity-synthesis for propositional intentions is: how can we describe the transition from an emptily meant propositional intention to a fulfilled one? There is no difficulty in describing the fulfillment of the simply intended ingredients of the categorical object; 'house' or 'brown' are saturated by normal perceptual fulfills. But if we mean the whole proposition, 'The house is brown', Husserl sees a problem in what the formal term 'is' can mean when it is saturated. Formal components such as 'is', 'and', 'next to', etc. do not find their fulfillment in perceptual moments given in the thing. How are they supposed to be fulfilled?

'Is', 'and', and 'next to', as syncategorematic components of propositional wholes, are the deposit left by various categorical, 'intellectual' acts of consciousness; they are not read off things as attributes, but originate in the acts by which consciousness articulates discrete parts within what it means and simultaneously composes a whole out of these parts. Specifically, 'is' is the deposit of a predicative act, 'and' is the deposit of an act of collecting, and 'next to' is left by an act of relating. Now empty intending in such cases just means not to execute such acts explicitly, but to intend their object signifiitively. When we say 'and' but do not assemble 'this and that' explicitly, we mean the categorical form emptyly, and mean the categorical object emptily. Then when we actually do collect the two items, we have the 'and' given intuitively.

A clearer example is the case of a difficult mathematical proof. Suppose that in step fifteen of the proof I am told to combine $A$ and $B$. If I have been confused by the proof so far, I cannot authentically combine the two; I can emptily assert, 'Yes, now I have $A$ and $B$', but the 'and' is not really at work here. It is only emptily, signifiitively, verbally meant. But if I learn the first fourteen steps, then it becomes possible for me actually to engender the new categorical object, 'A and B', in step fifteen, The categorical object 'A and B' is now intuitively meant; the act that constitutes 'and' is actively, energetically at work; the 'and' is intuitively given.

I can intuitively constitute the categorical object as meant, however, and still be a step away from what I finally intend. For instance, I may explicitly say: 'His car is red', and if I happen to be in a car and am not intuiting that state of affairs. Or I may say, 'His new car is red', while I am not seeing the car and may not be able to verify the proposition.
directly. How can such empty intentions be brought to saturation? Only by bringing them to intentional categorial objects, that is, to the states of affairs themselves, by going to the front and directly seeing ‘that the front door is open’, or by seeing his car and determining ‘that it is red’. The point is that states of affairs saturate such empty intentions; at all stages of the identity-synthesis, both in empty and intentional consciousness, we remain in categorial or propositional consciousness. The given which finally saturates in this case is itself a categorially formed given, a state of affairs, a ‘fact’. We do not descend into simple, perceptual consciousness.

Although categorial consciousness is never changed into perceptual consciousness, it is founded upon the latter. That is, verifying that his car is red involves as its condition certain perceptual acts which make present those objects that can be dismembered into the appropriate states of affairs or facts. I can intuitively verify that the car is red only upon the condition of looking at the car, but taking a look is not making a judgment. I have to dismember the parts intellectually and articulate the new categorial object in the presence of the thing before I have a judgment.

A propositional intuition can always get submerged back into the simple perceptual consciousness it is founded upon. The intuitive presence of the state of affairs, ‘This car is red’, gets de-synthesized, the propositional consciousness can let its distinct parts blend back together into the continuous seeing of ‘red-car’, as the judgmental consciousness dissolves and I go back to merely looking at the car, perhaps from various angles and distances, letting the simple perceptual given sink in. But when this happens we no longer have a propositional intuition; we have moved back into simple intentions. This simple perception does not by itself serve to fulfill an empty propositional intention; only a fulfilled propositional intention could do that. But the simple intention is a condition for there to be a fulfilling propositional intention; unless the appropriate object is given in a simple intuition, there would be nothing lending itself to the dismemberment and articulation that yields the fulfilling categorial object.

Sometimes there are empty propositional intentions whose component meanings are such that they can never be submerged into a coherent simple perceptual experience. Propositions like, ‘Sleep is yellow’, or ‘He is standing next to the sonata’, have nothing wrong with their formal syntax, but, if taken literally, are meaningless; the words ‘sleep’ and ‘yellow’ do not work together in the same language game. Husserl explains why they don’t work together: when we try to de-synthesize the proposition and submerge it into a perceptual intention of ‘yellow-sleep’, no possible object could be given in fulfillment. Sleep is not the kind of thing that has color.

It is also in this context that Husserl resolves ‘the senseless problem of the real meaning of the logical’. The question, ‘To what component of the real world do logical structures correspond?’ is senseless and a category mistake, because it expects perceptual intuition to disclose the presence of formal, categorial moments in things, as though they were there in things before the categorial activity of consciousness took place. Perceptually given things lend themselves to categorial activity and thus found the categorial objects constituted in such activity, but formal components are not a part of what is given to simple perceptual consciousness. Then the fear that perhaps logical structures conceal the real world, or that the real world may follow laws of its own, different from the laws of logical articulation, rests on the same confusion. It assumes that things lend themselves to categorial, theoretical articulation, and then wonders whether this articulation has anything to do with things. It keeps hankering for a thing or a world that could be given to reason without such articulation. But, Husserl insists, there is no way to reason about the world — if we are to reason and not merely perceive — except to reason about it categorically.

Husserl’s explanation of negation is also given in the context of identity-synthesis. Negation is originally present to simple, perceptual consciousness when the continuum of experiencing does not carry on as we expected it to; the harmonious identification is shattered by presences different from what we anticipated. Negation can take place only within a wider identification, for certain parts must first find fulfillment and lead us to hope for further saturations; disappointment in the expected course of experience gives rise to the consciousness that the object is not green or round or whatever we expected. Conflicting parts are then disclosed, and we can articulate them in the form of negative judgments. The original presence of difference or negation, of course, is more primitive than the experience of falsity, which is reflexive and involves an explicit consideration of our intention and its failure to be saturated; negation is merely the experience of such non-coincidence. In this respect it is like the experienced but not thematized identity of direct, perceptual consciousness.

The three themes of meaning, acts and identification all work quite obviously with one another. Our fourth major theme, parts and wholes, is put into Investigation III and appears to be quite distinct from the other three. But in fact this theme pervades all the others. It provides the formal structure which is taken for granted by and operative in them, and is also at the root of Husserl’s theory of the a priori.

Husserl distinguishes independent parts (pieces) from non-independent parts (moments). Independent parts are those that can be detached from their wholes and still exist and be phenomena by themselves, like the branch of a tree or the limb of an animal. Non-independent parts, moments, cannot exist on their own; they are consciousness apart from their wholes. For instance brilliance cannot be given apart from color, and color cannot be given apart from extension.

There is a necessary connection between non-independent parts and the supplements that must accompany them. It is dialectically necessary, an a priori rule, that brilliance can be present only with color. Sometimes the rule governing supplements may prescribe several stages before an independent whole is reached: brilliance inheres in color, color in a surface, surface is a moment of extension, and extension is a moment of a solid object, which finally can be taken as an independent thing. In such a case brilliance would be medially a moment of a surface, but immediately a moment of color. The a priori rules that govern the blend of moments are not psychological.
habits, but are founded upon the objects meant and their essential structures. Independent parts, pieces, do not have a priori rules for their supplementation by other pieces; being independent, they do not need supplements at all, and when they are inserted back into their wholes, no specific rule of mediated progression is necessary. A finger is as immediately a part of the body as it is a part of the hand, according to this conception.

Non-independent parts or moments allow Husserl to justify the founded-founding relationship. A moment is founded upon the supplements it needs by a priori necessity, while the supplement itself founds the moment. Brilliance is founded on color, color founds brilliance; categorical objects are founded on perceptual objects, while the latter found the former.

In Investigation III, Husserl elaborates rigorously the formal structures of parts and wholes, particularly the rules concerning moments and their supplements. In the short Investigation IV it poses these principles to work in examining ways in which simple meanings fit together to form complex, unified meanings. There are a priori rules for combining various semantic categories into wholes which are acceptable as meanings; if these rules are broken, the result is not an acceptable complex meaning but a string of words without unitary sense, like 'King but or like and'. Such a combination is nonsensical (Unginnung). A priori rules for combinations are rooted in the semantic categories themselves, not in our psychological dispositions or cultural conditions. Husserl claims it is possible to discover basic semantic categories and to show the rules for completion whereby a non-independent unit can be integrated into coherent wholes with other units. This 'pure logical grammar' will reveal an ideal framework which each actual language will fill up and clothe differently, in deference either to common human motives or to empirical motives that vary at random. Studying the foundations of language must therefore involve not only physiology, psychology, and anthropology, but also analysis of the a priori underlying all empirical languages.

Proper blends of semantic categories simply allow the whole to constitute itself as a meaning. There is no guarantee that what is meant can exist as a real object or state of affairs. A square is round does not violate the formal rules for semantic categories, but it fails to blend properly in regard to its contents; Husserl claims such a whole can exist as a meaning, but no object could ever be given to fulfill the meaning. This whole is rejected not because of semantic categories and their rules, but because it is a priori clear that it is unrealizable. We have already approached this subject in our treatment of identity-synthesis; we can now fill it out in terms of parts and wholes.

Husserl treats this theme in two chapters of Investigation VI. In Chapter 4, he is near the close of Section One of this Investigation, where he has treated empty intentions and fulfillments in a general way but with special emphasis on simple intentions as opposed to categorical. This chapter then raises the question of blended meanings and shows that blends of certain contents are acceptable while blends of others are not. Acceptable blends are those that could, in principle, find experiential fulfillment in perception, while unacceptable blends cannot. The possibility or impossibility in each
case rests not on individual instances, but on the essence of the contents in question. The entire problem is treated in terms of wholes and parts; even the recognition of conflict, of the essential incompatibility of certain contents, takes place only when we try to blend the contents into a certain kind of whole which we propose can be given to experience.

Chapter 8, the last chapter of Section Two, which in turn is the climax of Investigation VI, also deals with blends of contents into acceptable wholes; its wholes are categorical objects, the domain of thought or understanding, and not simple perceptual consciousness. Categorical consciousness Husserl distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic thinking. Authentic thinking is that which brings about intuitive constitution of categorical objects, and in doing so must both obey the a priori laws that govern semantical combinations to engender acceptable meanings, and avoid contradictions in the wholes it combines. It would avoid, for instance, a combination like 'All A's are B's and some A's are not B's', which, although it obeys rules of combination for semantic categories, involves a formal contradiction. We could not intuitively constitute such a whole. The formal contradiction would prevent our doing so. But inauthentic thinking is merely the intuitive or empty meaning of categorical objects. We do not actually execute the categorical object, we merely intend it intuitively; in this case we may combine contradictory parts into a whole, which would prove unacceptable should we try to constitute it authentically and intuitively. However, even inauthentic thinking has to obey at least the rules of pure logical grammar, the laws for semantic categories and their combination into wholes, if it is to intend categorical objects at all, if it is to be thinking at all (for inauthentic thinking is still thought).

(a) Chapter 8 of Investigation VI deals with the problem of formal contradiction or non-contradiction in combining categorical objects; it does not explicitly treat of submerging the categorical object back into pre-categorical perception. (b) The latter theme is covered in Chapter 4 of the same Investigation, where the proper blend of contents is required for coherent thinking. (c) In Investigation IV the problem of pure logical grammar, the rules for a priori acceptable semantic combinations are discussed. Each of these themes is an application of the formal structure of parts and wholes, in particular the combination of moments into concrete wholes, as it is developed in Investigation III. The logic of parts and wholes functions this way in Husserl's description of the constitution of complex meanings and the conditions for their fulfillment.

But parts and wholes also function in all the major themes we have examined. (d) An expression is a whole with the physical expression and the meaning as its moments, the latter founded upon the former. The expression in turn must be supplemented by a signitive intentional act, for it is non-independent by itself. (e) A perceived physical thing is a unity present in a continuum of profiles; both the perceived thing and the impressed profiles are moments to one another. Further the perceived thing with its impressions requires the perceptual act as its supplement to become a philosophical whole of analysis. (f) The quality, material and representational or sensations of an intentional act are moments of the concrete act.
as a whole.\(^{64}\) (g) Meanings and objects meant are reciprocally dependent moments (h) Founded acts are clearly moments that require the acts that found them (i) The articulation of a simple, perceptual object into a complex, categorial object is achieved when consciousness discriminates and recognizes parts as parts within the original whole.\(^{65}\) (j) An identity-synthesis is a whole which involves the two moments of empty intention and fulfillment; an empty intention is a moment whose sense calls for the supplement of fulfillment, a fulfillment is a moment in relation to the empty intention it saturates. Each makes sense only in function of the other.

Finally, all the elements we have analyzed from (a) to (i) are themselves intelligible only in function of (j); all elements of consciousness make sense philosophically in terms of the role they play in the process of identity-synthesis or knowledge or fulfillment. Thus the essence of fulfillment is the over-arching whole within which all other parts of consciousness must find their place; it is the telos which gives them all their meaning. To describe the parts of consciousness philosophically is to show how each of them must find its supplements, according to the a priori rule implied in its essence, until it is nested in the whole which does not refer beyond itself, the consciousness of verified categorial presence, the intellectual and scientific consciousness of identity. Philosophical or phenomenological analysis in the Logical Investigations is simply taking something that appears to be an independent entity—a judgment, a perceived thing, sensations, or perception—and showing that it is really a non-independent part, a moment of a larger whole when it is examined in regard to what it does for knowledge.\(^{66}\) Phenomenological analysis means to identify very clearly the true sense of this moment, and to trace the supplements dictated in its essence. The reason Husserl claims his analyses are a priori is that they are merely such an unfolding of moments according to essential necessity.

But the logic of parts and wholes does not just fall from the sky. It is itself dependent upon the duality of empty intention and fulfillment, because the disclosure of parts requires consciousness of distinction, which is the reverse of identity-synthesis. This becomes very clear in the process of free or imaginative variation, through which an eldos is brought to intuition; the process is explicitly formulated only in Husserl’s later writings, but there are anticipations of it in the Investigations.\(^{67}\)

We begin with an object and, in imagination, vary parts of it while other parts remain the same. We attempt to imagine whether the object can change in some respects while remaining unchanged in others. If the object remains itself and some parts remain the same while others vary—suppose the color changes while the shape remains the same—the two parts differentiate themselves from one another. Then we may attempt to go further and not only vary the part in question but totally remove it; if the object ‘explodes’ and loses its identity, we find we have tried to remove an essential part of the object as a whole. For instance, a physical object could not survive the loss of extension or surface. If we continue to do this for other parts we should be able to determine some components of the essence or eldos of the object, the parts that are necessary for it to be what it is. Bringing the essence out in such a process is what Husserl calls eidetic intuition.

This process of variation is the reverse of an identity-synthesis, in regard to the object upon which the thought-experiments are performed. In a synthesis of fulfillment we have first an empty intention which finds saturation and recognition of any object as itself. But in eidetic variation we start with an object itself, and carry out imaginative experiments to see how far we can go and still keep it as itself. The process reaches its goal when the identity vanishes and recognition ceases, indicating that an essential part has been removed. In either case, in identity-synthesis or in eidetic variation, the process is made up of a blend of presence and absence under the guidance of a recognition of identity.

Moments are simply the residue of eidetic variations that had been naïvely executed in the past history of the language we begin with. A red cube can become a green cube while its shape remains, so color has been recognized as a ‘part’ different from shape. John can make the same judgment as Peter, so judgment becomes recognized as separable from any particular speaker (though it is never separable from all speakers; judgments always belong to someone). Now phenomenological analysis involves determining the independence or non-independence of such parts and, if they are non-independent, indicating the supplements they may require. But the parts originally arose, pre-philosophically, through the operation of objectifying acts, the presencing and absencing of an identity synthesis.

This brings our metaphilosophical analysis of Husserl’s philosophical analyses around full circle, because the logic of parts and wholes, which was fundamental to and operative in all the distinctions Husserl made in discovering and mapping the elements of knowledge, now turns out to be itself dependent upon the same functioning of intentionality it has helped to dissect. This result is not surprising, because philosophy is the one discipline that should account for its own self, but it does raise the problem whether the phenomenological distinctions and laws which Husserl discovers are manifest to consciousness and verified in the same way that non-philosophical objects, distinctions and laws are manifest and verified. Husserl does not say much about this in the Logical Investigations; it is explicitly treated as the problem of transcendental reduction in the Ideas and other later works, but even then it continues to depend on the formal structure of parts and wholes, just as it does in its implicit and anonymous treatment in the Investigations.\(^{68}\)

(5) The Prolegomena to Pure Logic, Volume One of the Investigations, have as their major subject Husserl’s refutation of psychology. In Chapters 3 to 10 Huller shows that the principles of logic and mathematics cannot be explained as psychological laws, as generalizations based on how men actually think as a matter of fact. Nor can they be taken as modes of behavior explainable by the physical composition of the brain or psyche. They, and meanings in general, have a status distinct from such empirical facts. They constitute the domain of ideal entities, not reducible to empirical facts or causal laws. Husserl carries out his attack on psychology by
long, detailed analysis and refutation of many authors and arguments; it is indeed a preparation for his study of pure logic in Volume Two of the Investigations, for it secures the reality of what pure logic is about: the trans-psychological domain of meanings, combinations of meanings, and verification of meanings in identity-synthesis. Volume Two, moreover, when it turns its attention back to acts of consciousness, does not return to the psychologism Volume One had rejected; it does not reduce meanings to the process that constitutes them. Rather, conscious acts are analyzed in their function of constituting the ideal meanings that had been isolated in Volume One. Although Husserl admits meanings cannot exist except upon the condition of there being acts, this does not reduce meanings to acts.

But the Prolegomena have another theme which surrounds the refutation of psychologism and also functions in Volume Two. In Chapters 1, 2, and 11, at the beginning and end of the Prolegomena, Husserl talks about the nature of science. He says that a science which explains by means of laws, a 'nomological' science, is composed of many propositions ordered in definite ways so that certain propositions serve to explain others deductively. The systematic ordering of propositions is not arbitrary or customary or cultural, but depends on the nature of things being explained and on what is said in the propositions explaining it. Husserl observes that the form according to which the propositions are ordered can be isolated from its actual use in this or that procedure of explanation, so that the pure form of a given science, or even the pure form of possible sciences in general, can be the theme of a logical inquiry, a 'theory of science'. Such an endeavor, Husserl believes, would consist in fixing the primitive formal concepts used in sciences and determining the laws that govern the combination of such concepts into valid wholes. This would be done both for concepts referring to meanings (such as 'proposition' or 'predicate') and for those referring to objects (such as 'object', 'unity', 'relation', or 'state of affairs'). It would examine the systematic relationships existing among such concepts within definite theories, and would even go beyond the analysis of single theories into the formal study of various theory forms, and their relationships and derivation from one another.

This description of science and its logic is another application of the theory of parts and wholes. Propositions or individual acts of meaning are seen in the role they play within sciences; they are taken as moments which are to be integrated according to essential laws into the wholes which are nomological sciences. Thus when Investigation VI culminates by describing the verification of categorial meanings, such meanings in turn must be understood as parts of a greater whole, that of a science. All Husserl's analyses of consciousness, even the isolation of ideal meanings from expressions, must be taken within the horizon of scientific consciousness. Whatever he examines is considered from the point of view of that totality.

The themes we have discussed serve to stake out the structure of the Logical Investigations and to show their major preoccupations. There are a number of less prominent themes which we should treat briefly to shed some light on parts of the texts we have not yet examined.

(a) Chapter 3 of Investigation I deals with two kinds of expressions which seem to be exceptions to Husserl's general principles of the ideality of meanings: occasional expressions and vague expressions. Occasional expressions are pronouns, demonstratives, the definite article, and assorted terms like 'today', 'yesterday', 'later', 'above', 'here', etc. Their meaning is puzzling; on one hand it appears impossible entirely to detach their meaning from the concrete situation in which they are used, and yet it seems we do understand them when we don't know their context. In some sense, 'yesterday' or 'he' have different meanings depending on when and where they are said, but in another sense they are understood even when totally separated from their original context. In the Investigations Husserl has a clumsy solution for the problem of occasional expressions. He says such expressions have a combination of two meanings: the indicating meaning, which is understood apart from a context, and the indicated meaning, which is given only with the context. The indicating meaning indicates the indicated one. Husserl uses 'to indicate' here in his technical sense. The indicating meaning is an indication-sign for the indicated meaning. The indicating meaning of the word 'he' is a sign for, stands for, the indicated meaning 'he (John Smith)', which in turn means John Smith in the normal way.

By the time of the second edition of the Investigations Husserl had dropped this account of occasional utterances. He explains that he was originally led to it by over-emphasizing logical objectivity. Indeed his original position leads to an extreme objectivism in which all occasional reference could, in principle, be eliminated from the use of language. Ideally speaking, each subjective expression is replaceable by an objective expression which will preserve the identity of each momentary meaning-intention. In principle, though never in fact, all 'occasionality' could be eliminated from discourse. This possibility would entail the possibility of detaching speech and meaning from all speakers and contexts. In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl again criticizes his original doctrine of occasional expressions, saying that he did not properly understand the role of horizional consciousness when he wrote the Investigations. That is, in the Logic he is aware that language is always spoken in a context and that some residue of the context, even if it becomes extremely indeterminate, is a component of the meaning of all discourse and intention, and is explicitly expressed in occasional terms.

Husserl also discusses vague expressions, those with indistinct borders. Words like 'shrub', 'bench', 'blue', and practically all common names used in ordinary language are such, and their meaning may fluctuate with the occasion of their use. Here again he claims it should be possible in principle to eliminate all vagueness; he adds that the fluctuation is not grounded in
the meaning itself, but is based on a vagueness in the act of meaning, our use of it. 83

(b) Husserl treats the problem of the ego only very briefly in the Investigations. He claims, in the first edition, that the neo-Kantian 'pure ego', the non-empirical center and owner of all intentions, is not given as a phenomenological datum. The only ego available to reflection is the empirical ego which is presented as the identity constituted through the sum of inner experiences. We are given 'the complex of reflectively graspable experiences described above, a complex which stands in the same sort of relation to the mental ego as the side of a perceived external thing open to perception stands to the whole thing'. 84

In the second edition Husserl states several times that he has learned to find the pure ego, insisting that this change does not affect the rest of the Investigations. 85 We can surmise that he was led to his new position, which is also expressed in Ideas I, by the elaboration of at least three themes: (1) The problem of phenomenological reduction and the explicit treatment of the speaker of phenomenological discourse, a speaker who is identical with the empirical ego and yet somehow differentiated from it because he thematizes the ego and its world. This speaker is the ego to whom the adequate evidence of the 'I am' belongs 86 (2) The problem of inner time consciousness, which discloses a kind of self-identity prior to explicit acts and full experiences of consciousness (3) The problem of other minds, of intersubjectivity, and particularly the problem of philosophical discourse among a community of speakers 87

(c) In Investigation II Husserl examines consciousness of universals, the intuition of cidos or species. Much of the Investigation is polemical, largely against the British Empiricists. Husserl's own doctrine is based on his insistence that it is clear, to phenomenological reflection, that we mean different objects when we intend (1) an individual, (2) an individual as an instance of a universal, (3) the universal itself, the species, (4) the species in relation to other species or to a genus. 88 In intending the species we may employ an individual, in perception or in imagination, as the basis for our thought, but what we mean and talk about is not the image or the object; we mean and talk about the moment which may be instanced in an individual, but which is meant for itself.

When the red object and its emphasized aspect of red appear before us, we are rather 'meaning' the single identical Red, and are meaning it in a novel manner, through which precisely the Species, and not the individual, becomes our object. 87

To mean a species like the cidos 'dog' is not simply to intend Fido or Topper, nor to intend them as similar, nor even as absolutely alike, as we might when we intend two indistinguishable instances of green. It is to intend that which is identical and the same in each case.

In fact, Husserl claims, the relationship of similarity between things is possible only if each shares an identical moment in respect to which they are similar. 88 He also tries to show that other attempts to evade the intuition of an identical moment in different things — such as the claim that abstraction is merely to narrow our attention to indistinguishable parts, 89 or that it is a method for economy in thought where one object represents many others 90 — all presuppose what they try to eliminate: that we mean and intuit a property, a moment that can be meant as identically the same in many instances.

The final major antagonist Husserl takes up is David Hume, and he tries to summarize Hume's position by saying: 'There is only one kind of real parts, the parts, namely, that we can also isolate, in other words, the thing's pieces'. 91 Characters or properties — the 'moments' of Investigation III — are fictions originating in custom. There is no 'distinction of reason' given in things. Against this position Husserl begins, towards the end of Investigation II, to formulate his theory of non-independent parts or moments, and to show that moments must be intuited as distinct from one another. He even claims that we could not talk about pieces if talk about moments were not legitimate and did not express what can be intuitively given. 92 In his attack on the Humean position Husserl argues only for intuition of instances of a species; the problem of intuiting the species itself is handled in Chapter I, but, as we have seen above, receives an adequate treatment only in Husserl's later works. 89 It is interesting to note how prominent the logic of parts and wholes is in this analysis of Hume. 92

Findlay's translation is splendid. Only someone with his literary skill and philosophical acumen could achieve such a graceful translation. The Investigations have less stylized and technical terminology than Husserl's later works, and for this reason Findlay's task was perhaps less overwhelming than that of Husserl's other translators, but it was difficult enough, especially considering the length and complexity of the book, and he has succeeded admirably. The second edition was used, and properly so, since the translation is meant primarily to contribute to philosophical issues; scholars interested in Husserl's development will have to continue to use the German first edition 90

Robert Sokolowski
The Catholic University of America

NOTES
1. First German edition published at Halle, 1900 and 1901, second edition in 1913 and, for Investigation VI, 1920. Findlay has used the second edition.
2. The Philosophy of Arithmetic still awaits translation, but it is generally considered pre-phenomenological.
3. I #1—#2, #5
4. I #2
5. I #9—#10. See also V #14, pp 566–7.
6. I #11—#12
7. Cf. V #27, p. 606: ‘Different people all appeal to such “internal perception” and come to quite opposite results: they read different things into or out of it.’ See also p. 607. My interpretation disagrees with that of Ernst Ingarden, who claims Husserl operates with concepts drawn from an epistemological and introspective process, ‘carried out independently of the question of meanings of linguistic expression’. See ‘Phänomenologie und Sprachanalyse’, in Hermeneutik und Dilatologie, ed. by R. Buhner, K. Craemer and R. Weihl, J. C. B. Mohr: Verlag, Tübingen, 1970, Vol. II, p. 6. As we shall see later, even acts are introduced in function of linguistic expressions. In Investigation I, Husserl gets to perception only in #23; he treats it after the model of comprehending expressions, and also as the intuitive fulfilling of what is emptily meant when we understand or state an expression. It is true, as Ingarden observes on p. 19, that Investigation V works directly with consciousness, sensations and perception, but Husserl carries out his analysis with the concepts he has fashioned in his analysis of linguistic expression in Investigation I. Also even V #14, pp. 566-7, says that the best examples of the structure of intentionality are given by verbal expressions, so the paradigm stays alive throughout.

8. I #31, p. 329: ‘We are not here dealing with a mere hypothesis, justifiable only by explanatory fruitfulness; we are appealing to an immediately graspable truth, following in this the self-evidence which is the final authority in all questions of knowledge.’

9. I #12, pp. 287-8

10. I #12, pp. 288-9; V #17, p. 579: ‘The full and entire object corresponding to the whole judgment is the state of affairs judged.’ See also V #28

11. I #15, p. 293: ‘It makes no difference whether the object exists or is fictitious or even impossible.’ Cf. V #11, pp. 558-9.


13. I #9, p. 280 See also V #14, pp. 566-7, and V #19


15. I #9-#10.

16. It is interesting to note that in his analysis of perception in Ideas I, the center of Husserl’s argument is to show that sensations are not signs for an object different from them. To take sensations as signs would constitute the ‘doublething’ theory of perception. Cf. Ideas I, trans. by W. R. Boyce Gibson, Macmillan, New York 1931, #43.

17. See VI App #6, p. 666, and VI #14b, p. 713: ‘In the ideal, limiting case of adequate perception, this self-presenting sensed content coincides with the perceived object.’

18. Vol. II, Intro., p. 226: ‘It is, in fact, impossible to describe referential acts without using expressions which recur to the things to which such acts refer.’


20. VI #25, p. 740: ‘Each concretely complete objectifying act has three components: its quality, its matter and its representative content.’

21. V #17-#19 and #33-#36

22. III #14; V #18, #42-#43.

23. V #19, p. 582

38. VI #8, p. 695.
39. VI #14. The trio is already anticipated in I #9, p. 280.
40. VI #23.
41. VI #10, #29 and #47. See also V #14 and compare to Plato's Republic X, 598a-c.
42. VI #10, p. 701.
43. VI #47, p. 790.
44. VI #14b.
45. VI #47, p. 792. Cf. V #38, p. 640: 'The single-rayed acts are not articulate, the many-rayed acts are articulate.'
46. Categorial objects are the objects for propositional consciousness. We can take this occasion to express another disagreement with Tugendhat, who claims that nominal meanings are given priority over propositional meanings in the Investigations, i.e., the consciousness of objects is made paradigmatic for the consciousness and use of sentences; sentences are merely syntheses of objects (cf. 'Phänomenologie und Sprachanalyse', pp. 4, 7, 12-14). But even though Husserl says categorial objects are founded on simple perceptions, he always retains the uniqueness of propositional intentions. Furthermore, his analysis of perception itself is done in function of categorial consciousness; the claim that a perceived thing is given in profiles (potential predicates) implies that it is considered as a potential part of a categorial object.
47. VI #43-#44.
48. VI #48, #51 and #67; see also IV #9b.
49. According to his general rules for objectifying acts (see Note 20), Husserl needs something to serve as a representative, an 'impression', for the actual intuitive presence of the categorial form. He finds it in the 'mental bond' that exists when a categorial activity is performed; that is, the categorial action is a combination of two or more simple, nominal acts (VI #56 and #58). This binding of the two acts is itself a psychic experience. It is a datum of inner consciousness, something we can feel. This felt process is taken by Husserl to be the presentation of the explicit categorial action, and founds the intuition of the categorial object. The theme of the representatives of categorial objects is laboriously developed and several alternatives are proposed before Husserl reaches the doctrine we have just outlined. But in the introduction to the second edition of Vol. II, he declares that he no longer holds this position (p. 663).
50. VI #60.
51. VI #30-#31. Submerging the content of a judgment back into perceptual experience is best described in Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. by D. Cairns, Nijhoff, The Hague 1969, #89.
52. VI #65, and also VI #30-#35.
53. VI #11-#12, #34. The reciprocity between objecivity and consciousness, and the similarity of Husserl's approach to negation and non-being with the Platonic approach in the Sophist, are reflected in this sentence: 'We shall have to explore the whole question of the natural circumstance of the acts to which the terms "same" and "other" (we can as well say "is" and "is not") have application.' VI #11, p. 702.
55. III #3.
56. III #10.
57. III #18.
58. III #14.
59. IV #10, #12 and #14; also I #15, esp. pp. 292-3.
60. IV #14, p. 526.
61. VI #31, p. 752: '[Wc] are rather concerned with a compatibility of meanings in a "possible" meaning, i.e., a meaning compatible with corresponding intuition in the unity of objectively adequate knowledge.'
62. VI #68.
63. The three themes of syntactically correct judgments, distinct judgments which do not violate the law of contradiction, and clear judgments whose contents blend correctly, are treated in a more systematic way in Formal and Transcendental Logic, #13-#15.
64. For instance, see V #22, p. 597: 'Quality and matters were distinguished by us as two "moments", two inner constituents of acts' Husserl also mentions 'certain other "moments" to be investigated later.'
65. VI #48.
66. In attacking psychology Husserl says, 'Has each of the parties not recognized a valid portion of the truth, and only shown incapacity for its sharp conceptual coexistence, and not even seen that they only had part of the whole?' (Italics mine) Prolegomena #20, p. 96.
Aron Gurwitsch discusses the process of eidetic variation and shows anticipations of it in the Investigations: see The Field of Consciousness, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh 1964, pp. 190-7.
68. Findlay regrets that Husserl later moved into the 'subjectivism' of Ideas I (translator's introduction, p. 10) But this turn was not an arbitrary move; the kind of analysis actually done in the Investigations needs the self-justification that the phenomenological reduction provides.
69. See Prolegomena #6, p. 181: 'We deny that the theoretical discipline of pure logic, in the independent separateness proper to it, has any concern with mental facts, or with laws that might be styled "psychological." We saw that the laws of pure logic, e.g., the primitive "laws of thought", or the syllogistic formule, totally lose their basic sense, if one tries to interpret them as psychological.'
70. Prolegomena #64, p. 230.
71. Prolegomena #6, p. 62.
72. Prolegomena #6, p. 63; #7, p. 65; #8, p. 67; #11, p. 71.
73. Prolegomena #68 and #69.
74. For instance the strict identity of meaning, the absolute demand for non-contradiction, and the elimination of metaphor are characteristics of scientific consciousness. Husserl has little to say about metaphor.
76. I #26, esp. pp. 316–17, and VI #5, esp. pp. 683–6 Statements like ‘I wish you luck’, or ‘I want to go home’, are classed among occasional utterances and are said to intimate what they say. The first statement both names my wish, and intimates or indicates it. See I #25, and Schérea, *La phénoménologie*, p. 173. We may recall that the difference between (1) indication-signs and (2) expressions which name and have meaning, was the paradigm for all Husserl’s distinctions of parts within consciousness and what it expresses (cf. I #1). The present instance, which directly violate that paradigmatic difference, lead us into dangerous waters, particularly because they involve self-referential discourse, the kind phenomenology is composed of. When phenomenology speaks, does it name or intimate? Some of the sharpness of this problem is removed in the second paragraph of I #25, however, where Husserl admits that in a strict sense, ‘I wish you luck’, is a judgment about my wish, not an expression of it J. Derrida exploited the collapse of the difference between expression and indication in *La voix et le phénomène*, P U F., Paris 1967. For instance, ‘Toute l’entreprise de Husserl… serait menacée si la Verflichtung acquoyant l’indice à l’expression était absolument irreductible, inextricable au principe, si l’indication ne s’ajoutait pas à l’expression comme une adhérence plus ou moins tenace, mais habitait l’intimité essence de son mouvement’ (p. 28). See also pp. 1–2, 17, 20–27, 46 ff.; pp. 104–8 deal with shifters. Derrida claims indication is inseparable from language, and that this inseparability destroys the Husserlian quest for evidential presence. It always keeps speech in a situation and prevents any discourse of absolute reason.

77. Foreword to the second edition, p. 48.
78. I #28, p. 321. Also I #29.
80. I #27.
81. I #28, p. 322. See also V #2, #4 and #6.
82. V #8, p. 350. See also V #2, #4 and #6.
83. See V #4, notes on pp. 541 and 542, V #6, note on p. 541; V #8, note on p. 549, and the addendum, p. 551. Also the second foreword, p. 49.
85. This is connected with the problem of the use of shifters or occasional expressions in phenomenological discourse; see Note 76. If there is a community of phenomenologists, shifters are somehow necessary and irremovable. The problem then arises whether phenomenological discourse is perspectival in some sense.
86. II #10, p. 357.
87. II, Intro., p. 337.
88. II #3, p. 345, and #37, p. 411. Husserl must justify eidetic intuitions because he uses them in his own phenomenology; cf. II, Intro., p. 338.
89. II, Ch. 3, #19–#23.
90. II, Ch. 4, #24–#31, esp. #25.
91. II #36, p. 409.
92. See II #38. In II #39 Husserl says no distinctions are possible at all if moments are not admitted; we cannot even distinguish between pieces, and we fall into sheer scepticism or into an epistemological monism.
93. See Note 66.

94. Some other themes that could be studied in a more exhaustive analysis of the *Investigations* are: (1) the status of real objects; (2) meanings as ideal entities that are abstracted from acts in the way that a species like ‘red’ is abstracted from instances of red. That is, the ‘nomic’ aspect of meanings is not properly understood in the *Investigations* (See I #31–#33); (3) the problem of meaning without language; (4) meaning in non-communicative situations (I #7–#8); (5) the sense of psychologism. Many of these themes are treated in Th De Boer’s work, *De ontwikkelingsgeschiedenis in het denken van Husserl*, van Gorcum, Assen 1965, which gives considerable attention to the *Investigations*.
95. There are hardly any misprints, but one that could be misleading is on page 219, line 21: ‘qualitative’ should read ‘quantitative’.