QUOTATION

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Quotation is not merely repetition, even though it involves repeating what someone else has said. Quotation is repeating something as having been stated by another. The difference is one of presentational or intentional form. There may be no difference in the words being repeated, but they are repeated differently: it is as though we no longer saw an object directly but now only in a mirror.

To quote is to say something as said by someone else. Why are not all the statements I say simply my own? Apparently just saying them does not make them my own: I can be saying them as another’s. My voice is not exclusively possessive. In contrast, however, a dog cannot quote another dog. A dog’s barks are inevitably and inescapably its own, even though they may sound like the barks of another dog. What is it in human speech that makes it possible for me to use my voice to say what another has said, and to say it as said by him? This strange duplication in one stream of sound is intimately related to having a mind. The activity of minding involves many duplications such as this. To explain what thinking is involves not just describing the activity of the brain, but also analyzing patterns of presentation such as quotation.

I

When we speak, we speak about something: Karen makes statements about her car, John makes statements about Karen, about her car, and about what she is doing. What happens when John quotes Karen? It is tempting to say that John then makes a statement about the words Karen uttered or the thoughts she had or her activity of speaking; that is, that when he quotes Karen, John simply speaks about Karen and what she does. It is tempting to say that John, when he states, “Karen said the car’s battery is low,”

Review of Metaphysics 37 (June 1984): 699-723 Copyright © 1984 by the Review of Metaphysics
has made her words or her thoughts or her activity the direct and exclusive topic of his statement. But to understand quotation this way would flatten the statement quoted into being a thing, one more thing alongside the cars, trees, people, and their features which we encounter. It would also reduce the activity of quoting into being an ordinary case of stating, no different in principle from statements about rivers and trucks.

What then does happen when John quotes Karen? John continues to talk about the car, just as Karen did, but he talks about the car as talked about by Karen. We can let a thing become manifest and articulated simply by ourselves, or we can let it become manifest and articulated as by someone else, and we can specify who that someone else is. Whenever anything becomes articulated and shown to thought, it is in principle publicly displayed not only for the immediate registrar but for others as well. And the point is that we are dealing with a thing displayed when we quote, we are not dealing with something simply in someone else's brain or simply with the sounds made by another. John deals with the car when he quotes Karen. It is even misleading to say he deals with Karen's words which refer him to the car: this would put all the weight on his relationship to Karen and make the relationship to the car secondary and dispensable. It would be one of those pictures that hold us captive and confuse the presentational relationships. First and foremost John is related to the car when he quotes what Karen says.

But he is related to the car as it is displayed by Karen, and presentationally Karen does get in the way. If John merely repeated what Karen said, instead of quoting her, he would more immediately be related to the car: "The battery is low." In such mere repetition, John would still be under the sway of Karen's speech; the car would be appearing to him as Karen articulated it, but he would not differentiate between how the car is and how Karen says it is. To be taken over by someone else's opinion is not just to transfer something from another's brain to one's own; it is to behave toward something, toward the object spoken about, in a certain way; it is to assume a manifestation, but to assume it naively, not distinguishing what is cognitively mine from what is another's. When we repeat, we assume the thing manifested as such and such, but we discard its having been so manifested by someone else. We leave out a dimension that bears on what is being manifested.
It is not incorrect to say that we can take over someone else's thoughts or that we can take over what is in someone else's mind, but if we say this we must remember that thoughts and the mind are never just what is in someone. Thoughts are a manifestation, and the mind is the ability to manifest, to identify and to differentiate. When we take over thoughts and what is in the mind, we take over the objects as manifested, as differentiated and identified; we do not just take over "signs" or "concepts," things that only give us hints of objects. The radical publicity and the being-with-things of thoughts and of the mind must not be overlooked. We must overcome the persistent myth of concepts separated from things, and the study of quotation can help us to do so.

Nelson Goodman observes that when we quote, whether verbatim or in paraphrase, our words are used to do two different things: they are used both to refer to and to contain what we quote.\(^1\) When John says, "Karen said, 'The battery is low'," or when he says, "Karen said the battery is running down," John's sentence includes a phrase ("The battery is low," or "the battery is running down") which serves to name Karen's statement and also serves to contain it. This curious conjunction of being able to name and contain makes up quotation. If John's statement merely referred to what Karen said ("Karen said this," or "Karen said something strange," or "Karen said the statement made up of the following words and letters"), John would not be quoting; and if his sentence merely contained what Karen said, he would be repeating what she said but, again, not quoting her. In order to quote, John's statement must both name and contain another statement.

But as John Searle has said, what we refer to when we speak about someone else's belief is a representation.\(^2\) We do not name an ordinary thing; we present or represent a representation. And we cannot present a representation without also presenting what it represents. It is a representation only by virtue of what it represents. Since we are presenting the representation and are aware

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of it as such, we do not merely repeat the representation: that would be simply to say again what the other has said. Instead we know we are presenting the thing as it has been represented by someone else: to present the representation, or to present the thing as represented, are one and the same procedure, the procedure of quotation. It is not the case that presenting a representation is to present only the mind of another; the mind of another is itself the manifestation of something in the world.

Quotation therefore is the extraordinary procedure of using a phrase to refer to someone else’s statement, and so to take a distance to that statement and to see it as accomplished “over there,” by someone else, to see it as a statement outside the statement I make now. But quotation is also using the same phrase at the same time not only to name but to present again what the named represents, i.e., to contain what is named. It is quite remarkable that we should be able to do this. Our philosophical analysis of quotation should not consist in raising or “answering” false problems about it, such as asking how we can get outside our own minds and into the mind of another, or asking what sort of magic mirror must exist in a representation, so that its target can be presented again in a quotation. Philosophical analysis is to exhibit the structure of quoting. Its task is to point out the various dimensions of quotation, to keep us from eliminating important aspects of it, and to help us recognize the domain of presentation or intentionality, the domain in which such differences as those among thing, representation, presentation of representation, and repetition can occur.

But how can intentionality or presentationality be like this? How is it possible that we can name and contain a representation? How and why can we quote? It does appear that it could not be otherwise. It is not possible that something should be statable by someone but not, in principle, quotable by another. The necessity is not brought about simply by the development of the brain, even though a certain brain development may be required as a condition for our ability to quote; the presentational structure must be seen as a structure of its own, in its own domain. We enter into presentational possibilities, they do not happen simply because of something that has happened to us. Manifestation and quotability are possibilities of being; being is determined by such possibilities. The necessity and possibility of quotation are also not merely the result of linguistic development, not merely the result of how a
particular language has evolved grammatically. It is not just because there are subordinate clauses that we can quote. The difference between statement and quotation, although reflected in language, is a presentational difference that finds expression in language. It is there in how we can cognitively behave toward things and toward one another.

II

The fact that we use language in articulating the presence of things helps explain how quotation occurs. In our normal experience and speech, while we perceive the object we talk about, we can register the object as featured so and so; we distinguish the object and its feature, and we register the object’s being so featured. The distinction is also an identification, the object is articulated. We use words to help us do this. “S” names the object, “p” names the feature, and a grammatical particle or form, such as the word “is” or some significant placement of terms in the sentence, expresses the togetherness of S and p, which is presented to us as we perceive and register the thing. Words and their grammar help us report the same state of affairs when we are no longer in the perceptual presence of the object talked about. In such reporting we remain concerned with the object as featured, even though the object is not immediately there before us.\(^8\)

When we quote, we take advantage of the words used to register and report; we repeat them or their equivalents, but we repeat them differently: we use a device (such as “She said that S is p”) to highlight them as being said by another. But their mention now is also a use, because they do remain verbal articulations and they cannot help executing their reportorial articulation, even though in quotation marks. The car’s battery does get articulated as being low when John quotes Karen as saying it is low. This verbal articulation lets us range very far from things and still remain cognitively with them. Reporting allows us to articulate things we

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know while they are absent from us, and quotation lets us articulate them as they are articulated by others.

I can thus be related to things either on my own cognitive authority or refractedly, through the authority of another speaker. When I quote someone, I have the quoted state of affairs as proposed by someone else; but in principle it is always possible for me to go on to possess the state of affairs by myself without an intermediary, to register the situation on my own. This is disquotation. When, after having quoted, I thus see for myself, I do not just register the situation, I register it as confirming or disconfirming what someone else has said. The situation is there for me in a modally different way. The space opened up by quotation is therefore triangular: I at point A can be related to the situation at point B either directly along the line AB, or through another speaker at point C, via lines AC and CB. The immediacy of my own cognitive possession of a situation becomes itself a qualified immediacy because I now know that I can be cognitively related to it not only by myself but also through another. “By myself” takes on a deeper hue. The flexibility introduced by quotation can fail to be appreciated by two kinds of people or two characters of mind: by the gullible person who always just takes over, repetitiously, as his own and as being the case, anything the others say; and by the obstinate person who is so saturated with his own point of view that the statements of others are seen either as little more than echoes of what he says, or else as rather foolish fancies that he never really entertains as opinions.

Our basic and spontaneous way of registering and reporting is to do so with belief. Belief is not added to disclosures; disclosures are originally belief-acts. But quotation permits a wide range of doxic modifications. I may quote believably (“Why are you moving so slowly?” “Because Andy said the road is slippery here”) but the intrusion of another speaker as the one being quoted inevitably introduces a hiatus between my voice and the statement mentioned, between what I think and what I say, since I am now engaged in

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4 Of course, instead of going to see for myself, I can just turn to some other and greater authority than the person I have quoted, to someone in whom I have greater trust. On the basis of what he says, I can disquote and merely state, as true, what I have been quoting. In such a case I do not appeal to my own registrations but to more authoritative reports.
displaying the mind of another (and, simultaneously, displaying what the other minds). Even when I quote believingly, I do not speak simply in my own voice but let the voice of another carry the weight of articulation. I exercise a refracted belief and I take some distance to the responsibility for the truth of what is said. Furthermore, once I allow another’s mind into my own voice, I can quote neutrally, not taking a doxic position regarding what I quote, or I can quote disbelievingly. And a wide range of possibilities exists between belief and neutrality, between neutrality and disbelief: I can quote doubtfully, assuredly, with probability or with certainty, suspiciously or mockingly. Such doxic variations are made possible by the distinction between my own statement and what I quote. Furthermore, while what I quote may be stated in one doxic modality (I may quote suspiciously), my own statement initiating the quotation (“She said . . .”) comes across with its own belief, its own doxic form, which may well be different from the modality belonging to the quoted statement.

The differences in doxic modality can get inside and cut through the quotation itself. I have a double access to whatever I am talking about when I quote: my own access, and the access I have through the person I quote. Therefore (1) I can exploit this difference and say, “About the High School Latin teacher: Henry says he is confused.” In this case I use my own access (and that of my interlocutor) to establish a reference, but I use the cognitive authority of the one I quote for the articulation of the object referred to. I establish the existence of the teacher on my own, apart from any quotational warrant, but I appeal to Henry for something said about the teacher. (2) At the other extreme, I can obtain both the reference and the articulation on the authority of the person quoted: “Henry says that there is a High School Latin Teacher and that he, the teacher, is confused.” Here my own authority recedes into the background; everything, even the reference, is taken from Henry. (3) But both the quotations we have examined are somewhat artificial. Normally we do not explicitly either split or fuse our quotational references and articulations. Normally we just say, “Henry says the High School Latin teacher is confused.”

When we speak this way we incline really toward the first of the cases we have just discussed, to the establishment of reference on our own authority. I and my interlocutor are exploiting our own access to, our own handle on, the object of reference. We are
assuming there is a High School Latin teacher and we look to Henry to tell us he is confused. The use of the definite description ("the High School Latin teacher") implies we believe there is such a target of identification. However, we place this target as to be "hit" by the person we quote, and we normally assume that the person we quote also has access to the object, under the description we use to target it. If Henry heard us talking he would agree, "Yes, the High School Latin teacher is confused, as I said he was."

But this structure can be made more complex when my interlocutor and I establish a target of reference under a name or a description that is unknown to the person we quote. Suppose that Paul does not know that the man working in the Post Office is Max I might say, “Paul says that Max is rude.” Here I am taking advantage of the fact that I and my interlocutor know who Max is, so I establish a reference to him under an aspect familiar to us, but then I present Max as he is presented by Paul: as being rude. Paul could not say that Max is rude; he would say only that the clerk is rude. But if my interlocutor and I know that Max is the clerk, it would be silly for me to say, “Paul says the Post Office clerk is rude.” I would not be identifying him appropriately in my speech situation; indeed my interlocutor might not even know that Max works in the Post Office. I have to establish a reference in terms of the audience I am addressing, not in terms of some disembodied or unsituated speech. I refer to the target in terms clear to us but opaque to Paul, the person I quote.

And the structure exemplified in the case of Max does not occur only rarely. It is not a quirk in quotation. It happens whenever people who are “in the know” speak about, or quote, the opinions of those who are not. It is how we can present the opinions of those to whom the thing discussed only partially or only accidentally appears: “He said the heart attack was indigestion” (we doctors know it is a heart attack, but he says it is indigestion); “He said the heart attack (his ‘indigestion’) came on slowly at first but then became severe.” The startling thing here is not simply that a thing can appear to someone as other than it is; nor that we can quote the one to whom it so appears; but that we can register precisely the thing’s appearing other than it is (or the thing’s being other than it appears) when we quote the person, even though that person does not realize the thing’s otherness. The object as we refer to it is concealed to the speaker we quote, and we the quoters are aware
of the concealment; and yet the “same” object is manifest under another aspect to the one we quote, and it is the presence of this other aspect ("... is rude") that makes up what we quote him as stating. This is an extraordinary exercise in display and verification.

This same structure takes place in deception, when those in the know may want, for example, to make Paul perceive the clerk as rude but not to know it is Max who is the rude clerk; or to make someone think something indicates where and when the invasion will occur, but not to think that the sign has been deliberately planted by someone ("They think our decoy indicates the attack will start tomorrow"). All such relationships are based on the triangular structure of quotation, on the fact that I can be related to situation B either directly or through C, through the person whom I quote. They are based not just on grammatical or semantic structures in language, but on the structure of intentionality and on the presentational possibilities of things.

The presentational orders become greatly amplified when we introduce theatrical depiction, particularly in the case of disguises and revelations among characters within a play. In examining the phenomenology of such situations, we must keep in mind not only the relationship of the characters one to another, but also the cognitive or disclosive relationship of the characters to the audience. A character in Der Rosenkavalier could for example say, "The Marschallin says she loves the young man Oktavian," but a member of the audience could not really say, "The Marschallin says she loves a mezzo-soprano," or "The Marschallin says she loves Christa Ludwig." The audience is not in the know in the same way a doctor is in the know regarding his patient and his patient’s symptoms. But a character in the opera could say, after Oktavian has dressed as the maid, "Baron Ochs says Oktavian is stunning." We enjoy watching such depictions because they give us the opportunity to pull off complex distinctions and identifications, both on our own and as multiply refracted through others.

Any conversational use of language, even the conversations of mentally ill speakers, assumes considerable referential continuity.⁵

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But referential contact is not simple-minded; it is not just what I sustain in regard to an object in my own stream of words. It is established among interlocutors and it is sustained even when other voices, the voices of absent speakers, are introduced into the discussion through quotation. My referential continuity is also yours, when we speak together, and it is that of the other partners in our discussion as well as of those who merely listen and look on. The speeches of others who are quoted but who are not now themselves speaking are woven into our referential continuity: sometimes as authoritative statements, sometimes as things to be merely entertained, sometimes as positions to be destroyed, sometimes just as dicta to be noted. The thing to be studied when we study quotation is not a single mind, nor is it a single sentence that happens to have a quotation inside itself; it is rather the complex pattern of discussion, argument, and discourse with its plasticity, its capacity to include so many different voices, so many different assertions, even those of speakers who are not with us while we speak. The whole is the conversational setting, not the relationship of a single mind or a single sentence to an object.

This is the conversation that Socrates turns to in his second sailing (Phaedo 99C-100A): “It seemed to me that I had to flee to what is said and look for the truth of things in that.” Socrates turned from things to things as stated (and, we might add, to things as presented in all the ways they can be presented and intended), just as one might, to save one’s sight and to see better, turn from looking at the sun to looking at the sun reflected in water. Dimensions of things show up in the medium of what is said that do not show up when the things are looked at directly.

Many of the quotational phenomena we have discussed have been treated in recent decades under the rubric of referential transparency and referential opacity. Our phenomenological approach, however, introduces the domain of presentation or intentionality and does not treat transparency and opacity exclusively in terms of logical and linguistic structures. The logical and linguistic structures reflect and express presentational possibilities, such as the possibility of presenting something as it is being presented by someone else, or the possibility of speaking about things as being spoken about by someone else. Quine says, “If we are limning the true and ultimate structure of reality, the canonical scheme for us is the austere scheme that knows no quotation but direct quotation.
and no propositional attitudes but only the physical constitution and behavior of organisms.\textsuperscript{6} Quine thus eliminates the quotable representation of things, or things as represented; the “direct quotation” he allows is merely the repetition of the words stated by others, and this in turn “we can even dissolve ... altogether, into spelling, when we please.”\textsuperscript{7} Speakers dissolve into organisms, thinking into brains, language into sounds. The basis for Quine’s reductionism is his rejection of propositions as mental entities; with propositions gone, there seems to be nothing for propositional attitudes to be about, hence there are no propositional attitudes. However his understanding of propositions is inadequate; we need not posit propositions as mental or intentional entities, but we can legitimately acknowledge that we not only talk about things, but speak about them as spoken about by others or by ourselves. This modification, this quotational ascent, is all that is needed to permit quotation, and subsequently to permit various doxic attitudes and the presence of mind. The “true and ultimate structure of reality” contains the things we talk about, but it also contains their being talked about and presented and represented in a multitude of ways.

III

Although we cannot reduce quotation to the repetition of words or sounds, there are cases in which the point of quoting is not to convey another’s proposition—the way things seem to him or the way he says they are—but to convey primarily the words stated or the sounds made: but always as words stated or sounds made by another. There are cases of quotation in which the propositional dimension recedes and the sentential, the verbal or the phonemic increases in prominence. In cases like these, paraphrase is not possible; we must convey the exact words or the exact phonemes.

Vulgar words or swear words fall into this category: “\textit{What did he say}?” “He said \textit{X}” “\textit{Outrageous}” So do other offensive words: “\textit{What did he say when he described your clothes}?” “\textit{Rags. He said \textquote{rags}}” Such a quotation is almost propositional, but it really

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., p. 212.
tips into the verbal; it is not the concept or the proposition but the word, with its emotional overtones, that is conveyed in the quote. At the other emotional and aesthetic extreme, a beautiful phonemic line, an elegant word or phrase, a well-turned sentence can be quoted as such: attention is drawn to them as sounds, words, and sentences, and the one who spoke them is given credit for saying them: "Tom once said, 'Take two totals and total the two.' Only he could have said that." The quoter repeats them as having been achieved by another, and he quotes them or embeds them in his own speech.

Such quotation is different from giving an example of a sound, word, or sentence; if I show how the German "ch" or the Polish "cz" is pronounced, or if I give the Greek word for battleship, I do not quote a German or a Pole or a Greek. But if I show what Hans said when he got angry, I do quote him as having uttered that then, even though I may not use my quote propositionally; I may not display a state of affairs or a view of things through him, but I still quote and do not mimic Hans.

We run into an interesting marginal case when I show how Hans pronounces his "th" in English: "Here's how he says it: 'zees' for 'these', or 'zeeater' for 'theater'." Yesterday for example Hans said, "Zees people vent to ze zeeater.'" When I do this I mimic and no longer quote, even though I embed the vocalization of another in my own discourse. And with the case of mimicry we reach three duplicative possibilities: (1) propositional quotation, as studied above in sections I and II; (2) linguistic quotation, i.e., phonemic, verbal, or sentential citation; (3) mimicry of sound.

When I mimic Hans I do not quote him, even though it may appear that I do so ("Listen to this. Yesterday Hans said, 'Zees people vent'.") I imitate him, reproduce his material achievement, much as I might imitate his limp or his gestures. My voice is made to resemble his. I do present another as other to me, but it is his physical behavior that I represent, not the words he accomplishes. In contrast if I say, "Tom said, 'Total the two'," and if I wish to emphasize the phonemic pattern and not the play of meanings, I do pick up a phonemic pattern that can be detached from Tom, even though it bears his stamp and few other people would have said anything like that. I do not mimic Tom, I quote him, even though the point of the quote is phonemic and sentential—the alliteration of t's and the balance of o's and the chiasms—and not propositional. My voice does not resemble Tom's and I need not make it resemble
his (whereas in mimicry I must make my voice resemble another’s); precisely in my own voice I am able to say phonemically what he said.

Why is it that I can quote Tom phonemically, verbally, and sententially? Why does such linguistic citation not become mimicry? The reason is that speech involves a selection of sounds and patterns on the part of the one who speaks. The phonemes, words, and grammar have been chosen by the speaker. The choices are selections made within the possibilities that our language gives us. When someone speaks, the penumbra of the alternative phonemes and words and grammatical moves, of those he could have chosen but in fact did not, always surrounds what he does say, and these unchosen options are appreciated, with greater or less explicitness, by the one who listens to him speak. The unsaid cushions what is said. The speaker’s speech is thus shot through with choice, and the speaker’s ability to choose—his linguistic and intellectual character—asserts itself in what he says. But linguistic mannerisms, such as saying “zees” for “these,” are not the deposit of choice. Hans does not choose “zees” as opposed to “these.” Linguistic mannerisms are simply a bodily insistence, like a twitch or a snore.

Now a quotation is an imitation of choices, not an imitation of behavior; mimicry is the imitation of behavior. I can quote Tom even though my voice is very different from his because in quotation I repeat the selections he made within the linguistic matrix. But Hans does not linguistically choose “zees” over “these”; he cannot help talking this way, hence mimicry usually involves some ridicule. I display how his materiality intrudes on his speech and I do not submit my speech to his choices. But in quotation I let someone’s choices occur again: the similarity of the choice is more important than the similarity of the sound. The element of choice makes quotation more spiritual, more independent of the actual physical sound, than mimicry could be.

But in quotation I do not simply make the same choices Tom made (that would be mere repetition, the submission of my mind to Tom’s). I make the choices as having been made by Tom. I imitate his selections. What is it to imitate a choice? It is to make a selection, actually to choose this phoneme, word, or structure, but to make it clear that it is not my choice but someone else’s. How can we make a choice precisely as the choice of someone else? We do so by inserting in what we say some sort of signal that what
follows is not ours, that the next few choices have already been made by someone else and are here only being repeated. The cutting edge of our present choosing is allowed to rest momentarily while some cuts already made in our language, cuts made by someone else, are made again.

It would be wrong however to see linguistic choices as done for their own sake, to see language as a matrix just for structures and patterns. If linguistic choices were made simply for their own sake, language would be music. The selections made in language, yielding executed phonemes, words, and sentences, are made in view of a display of things that are not language: of trees and houses, anger and revenge, molecules and clocks. Unless we are just dabbling in language, which we can do only provisionally, we must be aware of more than language when we make linguistic selections. We must be aware of what we display with the words we choose.

And when we quote, our normal form of quotation is not just linguistic but propositional. We normally quote not just to display word-choices but to display something that is exhibited through word-choices. This can be illustrated by an analogy with the game of chess. Merely linguistic quotation would be analogous to imitating, on a board of my own and for an interlocutor of my own, the chess moves of another person playing at another board. I imitate the choices he makes within the options that the chessboard and the game of chess (analogously, the language) make possible for him. Mimicry would be imitating his grunts and wheezes or the way he moves his hand when he moves a piece. But propositional quotation would have an analogue if I were able to imitate his chess moves in order somehow to show my interlocutor how the quoted player opines that this or that thing is featured in the world. I would thus display not just someone’s game within the world of the chessboard, but something in the world as such, as presented by the one I quote.⁸

The choices men make in the world are never repeatable: if I choose to attend this concert or to buy that car, to help this person

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⁸A complicating factor, which we have not mentioned, is the pressure exerted on the person we quote by his opponent or his “interlocutor.” A full quotation would have to take that pressure into account: the person we quote does not just say what we quote, he says it in response to what someone else has said.
or to defraud that one, my choice is made within a definite situation and it rearranges the world in such a way that the occasion for that choice will not occur again. But language, the matrix within which we choose phonemes, words, and sentences, is more stable; the structural options remain the same for a long time, so I can repeat the same linguistic selections many times over. Language is something like the world of chess and the chessboard; it is an island of relative stability over against the ever-changing scene the world presents to us, and it allows us to bring a stronger sense of identity to things and experiences. It allows consolidations that experience without language could not provide.

In the world of language I can make exactly the same choice over and over again; I can state exactly the same sentence, word, or letter. And someone else can make the very same choices too. In the world of language we are not as radically riveted to a situation—to my situation here and now—as we are in the world in which we live. When I make a linguistic choice by saying something, I appreciate that I or someone else can make the same choice again later. That other person may be under the domination of my mind when he makes the same choice: he may repeat what I said without realizing that he is saying it because I said it. This is the kind of domination of one mind over others that Machiavelli considers a more powerful type of rule than the rule of worldly princes over their subjects. But the other person may later make the same choice as I did and be aware that it was my choice: here he gets out from under my domination by the very act of attributing the choice, the statement, to me. He exploits the linguistic dimension of repeatability, he brings that dimension to mind, he tags his "choice" as not really being his but only echoing someone else's; he quotes another speaker. We cannot do this in regard to political or moral choices, but we can do it in regard to language because of the kind of world the world of language is.

But the world of language is not the last world, and choices in it are almost always made with a view toward a display of what the world itself is like; this display will often invite other choices, nonlinguistic choices, in the world itself. So in imitating someone else's linguistic choices I also display how the world seemed to him,
how the world might seem to me and to you, and how the world might invite me and you to act.

IV

The world of language is seductive. Whereas the real world imposes a dreadful finality on our choices in life, language seems ever-forgiving. People who live in words can always go back to what they said and say it again and even revise or reverse it, but people who act must live with the consequences of what they have chosen. In action there is no doing again. The ideality of linguistic formulations gives us a more concentrated power of identification with which to cope with the world, but it also tempts us to escape from the world of real choices and to live in the pure identities it provides, in the elegant, regular, and always repeatable patterns that can be made with words. But since words are meant to display things, words themselves draw us out of the isolation of mere language. The semantics of language pulls us into the nonlinguistic. However, there is a way for us to get rid of this semantic element, to cut loose from the world of choices and situations, to enter into a pure and regular world, a world of patterns that do not display anything beyond themselves; we do this when we enter into music. Music is like a language that can rest entirely in itself.

And in music there can be citation, even though not all musical repetition is citation. If someone asks, "What was he humming?" and I say, "He was humming this: (whistle some notes)," I do not quote the hummer; I simply present the piece of music, another token of the same type. I "say" it myself. If a performer plays a potpourri of tunes, he also does not quote them; he "states" them. But if one piece of music is being executed, and it picks up or quotes a melody from another, or even picks up a whole melody that exists and is known as a separate melody, if the quoted melody clearly remains as a subordinate part embedded in the piece being played and does not take over on its own, the melody can be recognized as "spoken by another." In this way, for example, *Ein' feste Burg ist unser Gott* is quoted in the *Reformation Symphony* and the *Dies Irae* in the *Symphonie Fantastique*. On the other hand, the popular song "Stranger in Paradise" cannot be said to quote Borodin's *Polovtsian Dances*. The song does not embed the other piece in itself
Furthermore, a composition based, say, on a folk song does not quote that song but rather absorbs it, unless the folk song is asserted as another song by and in the new composition.

In musical quotation one speaker does not quote another speaker because the music is not used propositionally to display something about how things are to someone; the music displays only itself. It is not a substrate for proposition, as language is, unless the music is part of a song. But musical citation is not just mimicry because music involves choices; the sounds must be each selected in a musical piece, just as phonemes are selected in saying a word, and in musical quotation we imitate the choices as they have been made in another setting, in another composition. Our quotational choosing is presented as one step removed from the original choices as they were made elsewhere. The quotation is not a mere continuation of the melody we are playing but the interruption of another melody into it for a limited period. Musical mimicry would really stop emphasizing music as such: it would become one performer imitating another (Victor Borge imitating Rubinstein, for example). Mimicry again descends into the materiality of the performance and withdraws from the formal pattern and its choices.

When we turn from musical quotation to citation in the visual arts, two critical questions arise: "What works as a name or a reference in a painting?" and "What works as a quotation?" If a painter wishes to "mention" another painting inside his own, he does not write the name or the description of that other painting; that would not be a pictorial reference. Instead he depicts it in a special way. He puts it into his painting as a picture that some of his depicted characters—whether actually there in the painting or only possibly there—might look at. For example an artist may paint a view of the Phillips Gallery and include Renoir's *The Boating Party* on the wall as a pictorially mentioned or named painting, a "nominalized" painting. The purest form of a merely mentioned painting would be a few dabs of paint, just enough to suggest that it is *The Boating Party* that is there for the "viewer" who is inside the larger picture. The few brush strokes would be analogous to a name or a definite description of the painting being referred to. Thus the artist who painted the view of the Phillips Gallery would, by his bits of color, have mentioned, pictorially, *The Boating Party* to me, the spectator looking at his painting, and he would have mentioned it to me as a painting that someone inside *A View of*
the Phillips Gallery could look at and pictorially articulate; and he would also have mentioned it as a painting that Renoir has originally stated.

Pictorial quotation, on the other hand, would involve making the cited painting a more active part of the new, stated painting. An excellent example of this is Matisse’s Nasturtiums and “The Dance.” Matisse painted a group of human figures dancing in a ring and called the painting The Dance. For a while he kept this painting in his studio. He placed it behind a stand on which there was a pot of nasturtiums, their tendrils curling down around the legs of the stand. Matisse found this arrangement interesting and painted a new picture with The Dance cutting across the back and the nasturtiums in the foreground, hence Nasturtiums and “The Dance.” The background is not simply the ring of figures, it is the painting of these figures, and that painting is now part of another painting. But it is compositionally more active in the larger painting than The Boating Party would be in our imagined painting of the Phillips Gallery. The Dance is quoted by Matisse for his interlocutor, the living viewer of Nasturtiums and “The Dance”; The Boating Party would be just mentioned to the viewer as a picture that someone else—someone “inside” the depicted Phillips Gallery—might be looking at. This would be like my referring to “The statement Helen made yesterday,” which she made to another listener in another context.¹⁰

Pictorial quotation helps us see that propositional quotation too must be a living, articulated part of the discourse in which it is embedded. It is not the case—as the treatment of referential opacity might make us think—that our speech goes on smoothly in its relation to the world and that it suffers intermittent truth-value gaps only when quotations occur, when it stops disclosing the world and just talks about other minds or other speakers or other speeches. All our discourse, even what we say when we quote, discloses the way things are or might be, and it does so in being articulated. While speech is articulated, the world and things in it are articulated. Some of the disclosures and articulations are achieved by us as being done or as having been done by others, but these too are woven into manifestations that you, I, and they carry on. We always

¹⁰ Although there can be quotation in music, there is no such thing as a reference to or a naming of another melody.
go back and forth between what is and what is said to be. The only time a gap occurs, the only time a manifestation is folded up and made truly opaque is when it is nominalized: when we only refer to it and do not articulate it and what it displays ("What she said," "The statement he made"). But even that is represented as a disclosure and articulation that have been achieved somewhere and sometime else, and not now unfolded in our conversation.

Finally, allusion is different, as a presentational form, from simple repetition, quotation, reference, and mimicry. Allusion is characterized by being fragmentary, partial, and casual. It is something like repetition because it picks up a passage or a tone or a style that belongs somewhere else: in the line, "To summon the spectre of a Rose," T. S. Eliot alludes both to a passage by Sir Thomas Browne and to the ballet, *Le spectre de la rose*; Debussy in his Prelude, *La terrasse des audiences du clair de lune*, alludes to the song *Au clair de la lune*, Manet in *Le déjeuner sur l'herbe* alludes to Raimondi's *The Judgment of Paris* 11 However allusion is not simple repetition because the audience is supposed to recognize the source as other to the new context. Allusion is also not quotation, because it mentions just a fragment of what is alluded to, or it assimilates merely a dimension of the original statement—the prosody, some figures, some chords or a tonal structure, a rhythm, a rhyming scheme, a prominent word—and does not reproduce the whole original statement itself. Allusion is something like a reference, but it is a reference that is merely hinted at, not one that is explicitly made, not one that breaks definitively with the course of things being said now. Allusion echoes and absorbs, it does not point away. Strangely, allusion has much in common with mimicry, but it is mimicry not of the materiality but of the form of something else. Allusion brings something from another context into the context of our present statement, but it does not break away from our present context as distinctly as do the other forms we have examined.

Quotation in philosophy can only be carried on in language, so it is different from musical and pictorial citation. Philosophical quotation is also, obviously, different from mimicry and from merely linguistic citation. The issue for us is to discuss how philosophical quotation differs from propositional quotation.

Speakers who quote propositionally, whether in direct or in indirect quotation, are engaged in conversation and in what we might call the enterprise of verification. They are concerned with what is and in this concern they often show what is said to be. They want to find out what is the case. But we who enter into the philosophical enterprise turn our attention to the verificational conversation itself. We therefore are not simply engaged in the conversation; we take an unusual distance toward it and try to state its formal, presentational structure, that which establishes it as conversation. Husserl has used the term “bracketing” to name what we do to what we wish to study when we become philosophical; such bracketing can be seen as an analogue to the quoting we execute when we converse. When we quote someone in our normal course of conversation, we take a kind of distance to what that person says and to how things seem to him; we can use that distance as an analogue for the different kind of distance we assume when we adopt the philosophical stance.

In this essay, for example, we have given instances of speaking and quoting; we have used the speeches of Karen and John and Paul and we have presented John, for example, as quoting what Karen said. But when we as philosophers did this, we did not quote John again from still another conversational position; we ourselves were bracketing what John said (including his citation of Karen) and we also bracketed Karen’s statement. What happens when we act this way? What occurs when we display the conversation itself, along with the conversants and that which is stated and disclosed by them? What kind of quotation is the bracketing done by philosophy?

It may be tempting for us to think that the move into philosophy makes us to be “in the know” in a more radical sense than doctors are in the know in regard to their patients, or than my interlocutor and I are in the know in regard to Paul, who does not know Max as the Post Office clerk. We might think that philosophers are a
sort of super-conversants in the human conversation, those who
know the true being of things, the things themselves, while others
know only appearances. We might suppose, for example, that phi-
losophers know that everything is really atoms in the void, while
other people think there are animals, colors, and sounds; or that
philosophers know that perception is really the excitation of sense
organs and the brain, while others think we can really perceive
tastes and surfaces. If we were to think this way, philosophical
quotation, bracketing, would indeed be an extreme form of ordinary
quotation, one in which the philosopher would never quote believ-
ingly: the way the world seems to everyone would have to be quoted
with doxie rejection, with disbelief. All opinions of what is manifest
would have to be dismissed. Only the philosopher would have a
handle on the way things really are; only he could succeed in the
verificational enterprise. His big voice would drown out the others
in the human conversation.

Such an understanding of philosophy is at work in the philo-
sophical and scientific enterprise initiated by Descartes. The
Cartesian scientist is a competitor with the other conversationalists;
he is supposed to do what all men do when they converse about the
way things are, but he is supposed to do it better. As a Cartesian
thinker I am supposed to “detach my mind from my senses”\textsuperscript{12}—
that is, to disbelieve the way things appear to everybody—and I
am to speak about things only insofar as they do not appear, only
insofar as they are the hidden causes of what does appear, the
causes known just to the mind and quite definitely not given to the
“senses”: “... I distinguish the wax from its external forms”; “... It
is now manifest to me that even bodies are not properly speaking
known by the senses or by the faculty of imagination, but by the
understanding only, and ... they are not known from the fact that
they are seen or touched, but only because they are understood.”\textsuperscript{13}
The manifest is disqualified. There is thus a kind of extreme and
total opaqueness of reference between the ordinary speech used to
articulate the manifest image of the world, and the speech of Car-
tesian science and philosophy. For the thinker there is a definitive

\textsuperscript{12} Descartes, \textit{Meditations on First Philosophy}, in \textit{The Philosophical}
\textit{Works of Descartes}, translated by E. Haldane and G. Ross (New York:

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., pp. 156, 157.
truth-value gap—a truth-value abyss—regarding the way things appear and the way they are said to be. The scientist or philosopher may have to entertain the views enjoyed and the statements made by others, but he can never assimilate them as his own, despite what Descartes calls "a certain lassitude" that always inclines him to do so.\textsuperscript{14}

The Cartesian enterprise is established by a shift in the way we are to understand intentionality and in the way we are to be able to quote everything said and presented in the prephilosophic attitude. This shift is more basic to the Cartesian enterprise than are the more obvious arguments Descartes gives to persuade others to follow his lead, arguments such as his appeals to the occasional fallibility of the senses, to the difficulty of providing secure criteria for the difference between dreaming and being awake, to the impetuosity of our wills. These arguments are introduced by Descartes only to make us adopt the new frame of mind, and after they have served their purpose he, at the end of the \textit{Meditations}, effectively withdraws them.\textsuperscript{15} Descartes proposes his new point of view as a way of improving on the verificational enterprise of the human race, a way of getting the enterprise on a better track than it had been on before, a way of avoiding the deceptions and errors toward which we are inclined by our nature.

But Descartes forces quotation into a destructive excess. Philosophical bracketing is not a rejection of ordinary experience; philosophy is not the loudest voice in the human conversation. Instead of competing with other voices and almost attempting to replace them, the philosopher simply turns toward the human conversation and the voices in it, and he considers it for what it is in itself. In doing this the philosopher also speaks about the things that are discussed in the human conversation, and he speaks about them as being discussed in the human conversation. He does not just talk about the concepts or ideas people have of things; he talks about the things themselves as they are the targets of the human conversation. He thus quotes what others say about the things, or quotes the things as stated by others; his interest remains with things and in this respect his philosophical quotation, his bracketing.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 149.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., pp. 189–90, 198–99.
is analogous to John's still being concerned with the car when he quotes Karen about the car.

But there is an important difference between the philosopher's citation of what others say and John's citation of what Karen says. John, like anyone else who quotes within the human conversation, may take a distance to Karen's statement as he repeats it, but this neutralized attitude rests on an engaged, doxie acceptance of many other things: of Karen herself, of Karen as speaking, of John himself as the root speaker in this situation, of the world as the general setting for the speech. When John says, "Karen said the battery is low," he may have distanced himself from the battery's being low, but he is doxically engaged in "Karen saying" and in the peripherals that cushion his own saying of his entire statement (his own voice, his being there, his audience, the world). The somewhat distanced "battery's being low" is highlighted as cited against a massive context of uncited, shadowy, and merely accepted elements. This context of the uncited must remain there and remain dark if John is to remain a member of the human conversation. His being and remaining a part of the conversation is defined by the presence of the unexamined context.

Now, in philosophical quotation, the entire conversation and everything in it, including its peripherals and also what it is about, gets citationally highlighted. The context itself becomes illuminated and seen as context, as being dark to those who are speaking within it. Even the philosopher's own person as also being, under another aspect, a member of the conversation—he is also Spiro, friend of John and Karen, the one who sold Karen the battery—is highlighted or bracketed. And rather than drowning out the human conversation, the philosophical voice is quite thoroughly subjected to it, because the access that philosophy has to things is in the way they are presented and represented in ordinary experience and in the arts and sciences. Philosophy describes the ways in which a thing can be perceived, articulated, registered, reported, forgotten, and remembered; how it can be quoted by John as articulated by Karen; how it can be clearly or confusedly experienced, mistaken for something else, and identified and differentiated by those who experience and talk about it. In doing all this philosophy targets its things by citing them as they are presented and absented in the human conversation. Philosophy does not circumvent the conversation in getting at things, but neither does it slip simply into being one of
the conversationalists, the one who lords it over everybody else. And what philosophy actually does from its special standpoint, what it does to what it brackets, is to carry out the kind of distinction-making that we have carried out in this essay.

In propositional quotation I do not merely mention and use the quoted statement; I also mention the speaker who makes the statement, and I mention him as the one who holds the opinion, the one to whom the position is attached. The speaker’s authority is invoked. But while I remain one of the participants in the conversation, I quote the speaker as a kind of alternative to myself; I myself become somewhat defined by not being the speaker quoted. The philosophical voice is never in competition with speakers in this way, because as philosophical it does not hold opinions that are in conflict with other opinions in the conversation. It mentions speakers but brings them out simply as speakers; it shows how having an opinion, being quotable, makes them up as speakers and shows how they can become disregarded if their opinion loses weight, how they can become prominent if their statements become repeated by others, how they can even remain hidden and yet influential if their statements are repeated by others as the way things unquestionably are. Philosophy examines the conversationalists formally as identifiers of the things, facts, features, and goods that are identified through the multiple forms of presentation and intention. It brackets not only what the speakers say but the speakers as well.

What a quoted speaker says is presented by the engaged conversationalists as what we and our interlocutors should either verify or disconfirm or take into account. The quoted statement might become a disquoted report if we come to accept it and assert it on our own. But in philosophical quotation the philosophers never enter into the conversation in the same way as propositional quoters do. The quoted remains quoted and is analyzed as such, and so are the reported as reported, the registered as registered, the disquoted as disquoted. Verification or falsification is accomplished by the conversationalists, not by the philosophers; the philosophers’ function is to show what verification and the other elements and forms of the conversation are. The philosophers’ statements are thus not an option to the statements made by the conversationalists, and the philosophers do not surface as yet more antagonists in the debate; what the philosophers say passes through the conversation without causing the sort of effect that the claims of the participants
bring about. What the philosophers have to say seems in a curious way obvious and noncontroversial to those who have to settle which of the competing claims in the discussion are true and which are false, and the philosophical distance engenders a kind of nonchalance that contrasts sharply with the urgency of the engaged human concerns. Error, confusion, loss, and vice are as interesting to philosophical analysis as are truth, clarity, possession, and virtue; indeed the latter could not be philosophically defined except as distinguished from the former.

And finally the philosophical citation of the prephilosophical is not a wholly new and alien element added to the prephilosophical. It is a completion of the kind of thinking, the distancing, that occurs in the quotations we carry on in our ordinary and our scientific exchanges 16

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16 I am grateful to Thomas Prufer for comments made on earlier versions of this essay.