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Husserl’s Concept of Categorical Intuition

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I Predicational Presence

In *Logical Investigations*, Husserl asks whether there is anything in what we experience which is expressed by words like “and” or “is.” It seems clear, he says, that there is something in what we perceive that corresponds to the word “house” and that there is something that corresponds to the word “green” when we say, “This house is green,” but is there anything corresponding to the word “is”?1 In another part of the *Investigations*, Husserl uses depiction to intensify this problem. He says that if we paint a picture of a house and a tree we can obviously paint the house, and we can paint the tree, but do we in any sense paint the “and”? Is there anything in any way in the picture or in real things that corresponds to a conjunction in speech? Or, to alter this example a bit, if we were to photograph both the house and the tree, in what sense would the “both” be photographed along with the house and the tree?2

There is, of course, one way to avoid Husserl’s question entirely. It is to say with John Locke that words like “is” and “and” express ideas of reflection, not ideas which things impress upon us. The place to look for what such syntactical terms name is in the mind, not in the things known by the mind. We predicate, and we combine ideas, and these mental activities are expressed by “is” and “and.” Such words name what we experience in inward perception, while words like “house” and “green” express what we experience in outward perception.

Husserl rejects this position. He claims it makes what we might call a category mistake. Words like “perception,” “judgment,” “denial,” and “collecting” can, he allows, name what we experience in inner perception, but “is” and “and” do not belong to this class of terms used for introspection. We are thing-directed when we say, “The house is green,” and we find the house being green. The “is” responds to something in the house, even though that something will not show up, like the color or shape, as one of the standard features of the house. The being of the house is not a predicate of the house, but it is also not a predicate of the psychological activity that
goes on when we see and judge that the house is green. Husserl
summarizes all this by saying that being is not given in what we call
sense perception, whether the perception be inward or outward. 3

Where then are we to find and how are we to experience what is
expressed by words like "is" and "and"? Husserl's formulation of
this problem had a great influence on the early thought of Martin
Heidegger, who later wrote that this issue in Logical Investigations,
together with Brentano's study of the signification of being in
Aristotle, were the foundation for his own achievement in raising
the question of being. 4 I propose to examine the issue of syntactics
in Husserl, along with other themes associated with it, not simply as
a set of interesting philosophical doctrines but as a way of showing
what kind of analysis Husserl provides when he does philosophy
and how his way of clarifying is related to what is done by some
other contemporary thinkers.

Husserl examines syntactical terms like "is" and "and" as they
work in what he calls "categorial intuition." (For the sake of variety,
and as a way of conveying some of the sense of the term, I will use
the word "registration" as a synonym for "categorial intuition.") By
"categorial" Husserl means the kind of thinking and experience that
goes on in connection with phrases that involve more than simple
names. Categorial speech, categorial thinking, and categorial expe-
rience is that which involves syntax. We can take it for granted that,
except for marginal cases like exclamations or words used to es-

tablish contact, all linguistically formed thinking and experience
involve syntax and hence are categorial. By "intuition" Husserl
simply means the achievement of making the object we think or talk
about actually present to us, as opposed to thinking or talking about
it in its absence. For example, actually seeing a football game is
intuitive in contrast to daydreaming about the game we wish we
were seeing; also, actually listening to someone play the violin is
intuitive in contrast to talking, while he is not playing, about the
way he plays it. This is the formal difference between what Husserl
calls empty intentions and fulfillments.

This difference, between empty intentions and saturations, is
realized in many varied ways. There is, for example, a difference
between emptily intending a simple material object and having the
object present; there is another difference, with another structure,
between emptily intending a state of affairs or a fact and having it
present; there is another difference between trying to visualize
someone's face and actually recalling what he looks like; there is still
another difference between referring to the first two lines of The
Waste Land and actually reciting them; and so on. The distinction between the empty and the saturated, although it may be self-evident, is not trivial philosophically; it is a difference that deserves study, and Husserl’s analysis of being and truth takes place in the categories generated when we work out the various facets of the contrast. Moreover, the various kinds of contrasts are involved in one another; the perceptual presence or absence of simple things is an ingredient in the categorial presence or absence of facts and states of affairs, so the philosophical unraveling of empty awareness and saturation leads us through the various forms that make up the manifestation of things.

What then is specific to categorial intuition? What kind of fulfillment or saturation occurs in registration? There is such a thing as precategorial or simple intuition; if I long for an ice-cream cone and then actually eat ice cream, the transition may take place with no explicit syntactical articulation. Everything may take place on the level of simple sensibility, despite the recognized difference between the empty and the filled intention. But suppose that, instead of just devouring the ice cream, I stop suddenly and say, “This scoop of ice cream is vanilla.” Instead of just wallowing, so to speak, in the visual, olfactory, and gustatory perception of this melting mass, I register something that I find in it. I say something about what I suddenly notice in it. This is a categorial intuition. What happens when we execute it? Husserl claims that we have the ice cream present to us, we have the vanilla flavor or aspect present to us, but in addition we have the belonging of the vanilla to the ice cream also presented to us. This belonging is present not as another flavor or as a shape or some other feature but rather as that which somehow underlies both the subject and its feature. Can we isolate this belonging? Can we talk about it philosophically?

Another way of saying that the belonging of the vanilla to the ice cream is presented to us is to say that the ice cream manifests itself in a certain way, as vanilla. We experience the ice cream as presented in this way. Therefore, besides the ice cream and its flavor, the presencing of the ice cream is also present to us. Not only do we have a thing and its feature presented to us, but we also have the presencing of the thing in its feature presented to us. Presencing is also presented, as well as that which is presented. It is this presencing that responds, in what we experience, to the word “is” when we state about something before us that it is such and such.

Still another expression for this is that we perceive the ice cream’s being vanilla. Therefore, besides the thing and its feature, in a
categorial intuition we also have given to us the feature's belonging to the thing or the thing's appearing as so featured or the thing's being so featured. These are different ways of expressing what responds to the word "is" in a predicative registration.

There is nothing extravagant in claiming that, besides things and features, presencings or presentations can also be made present. We must of course appropriately adjust our language if we are to speak coherently about presencings. We are inevitably inclined to treat presencings as though they were further features or things. Husserl's phenomenological reduction is a sustained effort to make us aware of the special condition of presences and to keep us from either neglecting presences entirely or turning them into things when we do philosophy. Husserl developed the theory of the reduction only later in his career, but the issue that calls for something like the reduction is already at work in Logical Investigations. Presences are already recognized and talked about in that book, and it would be only a matter of time before Husserl addressed the problem of how we can speak about them.

In categorial intuition, therefore, we have presented to us S's being p or S's showing as p or p's belonging to S. How does this occur? Husserl says that we begin with the undifferentiated, continuous experience of an object like the ice cream. Then we focus our attention on one aspect of this object, the vanilla flavor, which is made explicitly present to us. The vanilla, however, is not presented separately, as though it were an adjunct to the mass of ice cream; the vanilla is presented as the same as what was there in the original undifferentiated object. There is an identification between the vanilla made thematic and part of what was present in the ice cream before features were distinguished in it. The vanilla explicitly noticed is identified with the latent vanilla. Put more formally, a feature is always presented as identified with what was not yet articulated but could have been articulated in the original undifferentiated presence of the object of which it is a feature. We do not just have a narrowing of our attention to the feature; the feature is appreciated as coinciding with part of what was there before the narrowing of focus took place. We do not just have vanilla; we have the vanilla of the ice cream. It might be objected that the vanilla was there in the ice cream all along, but in fact it was not presented in focus until it was articulated. This is a difference in presencing, and it must be philosophically respected.

We have not yet finished with categorial intuition, however. What we have described so far is only the first level in its structure.
The differentiation we have sketched so far, the concentration of focus on a feature and the acceptance of that feature as the same as a latent part of the object, is still a rather passive affair. We have lived through the identification of the feature with part of the original object, but we have not yet made that identity itself a theme of presentation. What we have described so far can be called "taking an object as such and such," for example, taking the ice cream as vanilla or as cold. We have gone beyond a kind of mute and blind sensibility; we have begun to notice, but we have not yet reached categorial articulation. For this a second level is needed.

In this second-level achievement the identity between the feature and the object is not just lived through but explicitly presented: "The identity itself is now made objective." For this to happen, Husserl says, another act, another presentation, is needed beyond both the original entertainment of the object and the concentration of focus upon a feature. This new, higher-level act is not just added to the earlier acts; it is built on them. It is a presentation of something that has already occurred in the fusion of the two lower-level acts; it is the presentation of an identity achieved in them. The higher-level act is not continuous with the lower-level presentations; it is discrete or disruptive; we go back to what they brought about; we do not just add more to them. The identity, the belonging of a feature to its object, the object's being such and such, is what corresponds intuitively to the word "is" when we say, "S is p." This untangling of layers of presences is necessary to account for the sense and reference of the word "is." Thanks to this pyramid of presences and presentations, we are able not only to see houses and blotches of green but also to see and register that the house is green. We can have not only things and masses present to us but facts as well.

As Husserl shows in Experience and Judgment, the second-level presentation involves a new forming of the object and its feature. When, in our second level of activity, we go back over S and p, we first make S present in a new way: S is now presented or meant as a substrate. It is presented as that which has undergone a concentration of focus into one of its features, so that when we now intend it, we intend it as to be determined. The ice cream is there again, but there now as an expectant substrate. And when we go on to the feature, we now have the feature presented as a predicate, not just as a feature. The categoriality of the "is" stretches backward and forward to the form of the substrate and predicate which must accompany the "is" of predication. All these formal structures are explained by Husserl as transformations of presences and new
identifications Husserl accounts for subject, predicate, and copula by showing the levels and transformations of presences that bring them about. Subject, predicate, and copula are not simply grammatical conventions but structural elements in the way things can be intended and presented. Because they are presentational transformations of things, they can be cut loose from any particular thing and achieved in respect to anything whatsoever; not only ice cream but dogs, cities, flags, and chairs can be subjects of predication. But because subject, predicate, and copula are transformations of the presentation of things, the place where they are originally at work and from which they get their sense is in our cognitive intercourse with the things we experience.

We have been using a rather harmless example, the fact that our ice cream is vanilla, to illustrate categorial intuition. There are other, more subtle examples in which the various layers of sensuous presence and categoriality may be more vividly differentiated. For instance, the sudden awareness that there is a peculiar taste in the water I am drinking, the awareness that you look a bit pale, that he is acting enviously, that there is a scent of hostility in someone’s behavior toward me are cases in which we can imagine a kind of sensuous initial awareness first, in which a feature begins to call attention to itself, which is then succeeded by the more decisive declarations, categorially formed, with all the public effects that they have, that the water is indeed sulfurous, that you are pale, that he is truly envious, that this person has become antagonistic.

Furthermore, we have confined our analysis to subject, predicate, and copula, but there are many other kinds of categorials that modulate presences in different ways and generate syntactical differences in speech: demonstratives, prepositions, conjunctions of various sorts, various cases of the noun, and so on.

II. Various Absences Related to Categorial Presence

Categorial intuition or registration is the achievement in which an articulated fact is made present to us. The presence of a fact can be contrasted to various kinds of absence, of which I would like to mention two. First, we may fail to be in the physical or sensuous presence of what we are talking or thinking about; while we are in New York, we may talk about the airport in Frankfurt. We may articulate the categorial elements of our speech distinctly enough, but what we talk about is not there for us to register. I would like to call this kind of discourse “reporting.” Second, instead of being deprived of the sensuous element of what we discuss, we may not
be able to articulate the categorial element. This too is a kind of absence of the fact. We may use the words, but the thinking, the articulating that should go along with the words, may fail to be achieved. Husserl calls this "indistinct" judging. It may occur in the absence of the sensuous, material elements (you may fail to think along with me when I tell you about what I did last week), or it may occur in the actual presence of such elements (you may be confused by what surrounds you and unable to predicate, categorize, and think about it). Indistinct thinking is an extremely important philosophical theme which can be related to the Platonic theme of unexamined, thoughtless opinion, with all the implications it has in political life.

The categorial intuition we discussed earlier has to be contrasted to these two kinds of absences of the categorial object, the absence in reporting and the absence in indistinct thinking, and the many relationships that occur among them must be explored. There are still more complications of presence and absence, a whole array of which is introduced, for example, by the role of other minds in categorial achievements. The speech I use to register a fact can in principle be overheard by someone else, who may also register along with me; or he may be removed from the material ingredients of the fact, so that my registration is a report to him; or he may be confused by what I say and unable to achieve the categorial element, while I do achieve it. All of this adds a further layer of presences to the registered fact, because I appreciate what I clearly and distinctly register as being, say, only confusedly achieved by my interlocutor.

Husserl achieves these philosophical clarifications not by an appeal to structures in language, or simply by an appeal to psychological activities, but by an analysis and differentiation in the way things are and can be presented. Husserl describes the forms of presentation and the activities we carry out in making things present. The distinctions he elaborates in predication and in categorial intuition are distinctions and identifications in the presentabilities of things. Before discussing this way of doing philosophy, and before mentioning some contrasts between Husserl and other philosophers, I wish to describe briefly one other topic analyzed by Husserl in Logical Investigations. I wish to examine the kind of awareness that occurs in simple recognition.

III. Simple Recognition

Recognition is a more elementary kind of awareness than predication. Recognition does not involve articulating what is present into
substrate and attribute. We simply have an individual presented to us as an individual we are acquainted with. A friend of mine appears at the door, and I recognize him as Elmer. I do not concentrate my attention on any particular feature; I do not particularly notice his height or his noisiness; I simply recognize him whole and entire. Or, to take another example, I may look around the room for my glasses and suddenly spot them. I recognize them whole and entire; I do not articulate features in them. In such cases Husserl speaks of a single-rayed awareness, in contrast to the many-rayed awareness of predication. What is the structure of simple recognition? What is it that makes an object recognizable?

Husserl claims that recognition involves a fusion of two acts: recognition is not, as one might suppose, just an act of presentation, but an act of presentation fused with an act of intending or referring. There is the act of intending or referring, and it is saturated by the act of presentation. The act of intending or referring to the individual could be achieved all by itself, without the act of presentation. Then it would be what Husserl calls an act of empty intending. The act of intending or referring, furthermore, is what gives significance to the words that might be used to express what we think about or perceive. For example, even when Elmer is not around, I can refer to him by stating his name while I think about him. But when I recognize Elmer, this act of referring to him is saturated, Husserl says, by the act of presentation or intuition in which this individual is given to me. (Perhaps I should emphasize that I am not taking “reference” here in the sense of establishing a reference as a basis for predication. I am using the term in a more general way, as the equivalent to Husserl’s “intention” or “intending.” We are dealing now with a kind of awareness that is more elementary than the reference to a substrate of predication.)

In recognition, therefore, I do not simply have a presence; I have a presence meant or recognized as Elmer. The individual is presented as filling or as saturating a reference. It is the dimension of filling a reference that accounts for the familiarity of the thing I recognize. The object’s familiarity is explained philosophically not by any particular features or criteria we find in the object but by a difference in the way it is presented and appreciated. Once again, as in the description of predication, we deal with distinctions in the mode of presencing.

We are not yet finished with the components of recognition, however. Besides the act of presentation and the act of reference, Husserl says that there is still another act which is required, an
experience of the identity of the object both as referred to and as presented. This synthesizing act is the act of fulfillment or saturation, the act in which we experience the sameness of what we refer to and what we perceive. The experience of identity is not brought in by relating what we now see to something else, nor is it brought in by any sort of inference; we encounter the identity of what we recognize, and we encounter the identity in the thing we recognize.

Act of referring, act of presentation, act of experiencing identity: all this seems most clumsy, and it might appear unlikely that all these activities are needed for me to recognize Elmer. Husserl develops this topic in an argument which is even more complex than my restatement of it. Is there a simpler way to get to the nerve of his analysis of recognition?

If I recognize something, I have some cognitive distance toward it. There are presences that overwhelm me when I am involved with them; they may be terribly painful or wonderfully pleasant or extremely vague, but I am so involved with them that I am lost in them. As Quine and some psychologists might put it, I deal with a "looming" rather than with a thing. Once I am said to recognize what confronts me, however, I am no longer lost in it but am able, in principle at least, to name it and to acknowledge it as the same whenever it returns. I have acquired a "distance" to what confronts me, even when it is there at hand before me. This distance arises because I now appreciate what confronts me as capable of being absent from me. I also appreciate it as in fact being not absent but present; that is, I notice its presence. The very dimension of presence and absence becomes engaged in my experience of the object. I am no longer lost in what confronts me because I now appreciate it as present. All this is another way of saying that in recognition we have an act of presentation and an act of referring fused together.

Finally, I also appreciate that the object remains itself in its presence to and in its absence from me: that is, the identity of the object is experienced as well as the presence of the object. A thing can be recognized because it can be referred to in its absence and because it can be referred to in its presence and because it is one and the same in both presence and absence. Identity and recognition are handled philosophically by describing the compositions of presences and absences in which they are given.

I would like to elaborate this description of recognition by introducing a step that Husserl does not make. The further step will allow us to compare recognition with the predication we described earlier. What we have analyzed so far in recognition is analogous to
the lower level of experience which underlies explicit predication, that is, the level at which we focus our attention on a feature and experience the identity between that feature and what was latent in the undifferentiated original object of interest. In recognition we have shown how we experience the identity of what confronts us, as we experience its presence as saturating our act of referring to it. Now in recognition we can go on to a second level, which will bring syntax along with it. When we go back over our identification on a new level, we make thematic the identity that was lived through on the lower level, and we now express this identity by words like “It is Elmer” or “Elmer, it’s you.” This is not a predication, and the “is” in such expressions is a verb of identity, not a verb of predication. Moreover, the “it” which is the subject of the sentence does not express a substrate; it expresses a simple presence, a “looming,” if you will, which is identified with what we refer to when we use the name Elmer. Thus the peculiarities of statements of identification, and the differences between such statements and predications, are explained philosophically by an analysis of the kinds of presences and absences that stand behind the expressions.

IV. Contrasts with Other Philosophers

Husserl describes many other ways in which presences work. He describes the special kind of continuous identity we experience when we perceive a thing through time (this is different from the “discrete” identity that occurs in recognition); he describes the identity of our own achievements of presencing and referring and shows how these activities can themselves be recognized in memory, imagination, and repetition; he describes our own identity as we persist as datives of presentation through time. The point is that what he deals with when he does philosophy are not primarily things and features but presencings, their various kinds, the relationships among them, their compositions, and the identities that occur in them. In reading various authors in recent American and British philosophy, I have been struck by several issues which appear to lead toward and call for an analysis of presences but which do not explicitly acknowledge the shift in focus that would make an appropriate treatment of presencing possible. I will mention, in a cursory way, four such topics.

First, the explanation of the use of names given by Kripke and Donnellan involves the fact that there is a continuous chain of communication between, say, our use of “Caesar” to name Caesar, and the use of that word by Roman acquaintances of Caesar to name
him directly. That is, to refer to Caesar *in absentia* is somehow involved in the possibility of referring to him in his presence. This fact about naming is true, but it immediately calls for a discussion of the fact that an object like Caesar can be named both in presence and in absence and that naming engages the dimension of presence and absence. Philosophically, the nameability of things cannot be adequately treated except by a discussion of presencing.

Second, Quine has attempted to restrict his ontological commitments to those things that are absolutely indispensable for the exercise of science. He has concluded that not only bits of matter but also classes must be conceded as ultimate values of variables. Classes are obviously not just material things; they are material things taken as sums or as groups. Classes exist because things can be presented or referred to in sums or in groups. To concede the being of classes is to admit that, besides talking about material things when we do philosophy, we must also talk about the presentability of things. Quine attempts to eliminate ontologically other "abstract" things like relations, attributes, and numbers by reducing them to classes. We may argue whether these various forms of presencing can or cannot be translated into classes, but the admission of classes alone is sufficient to indicate the need for more than just physical things in philosophy. Moreover, Quine is, so to speak, backed into an ontological acceptance of classes because he cannot see how they can be done away with in the exercise of science. This negative argument is replaced by a positive explanation if we see the role of presences in philosophy. We are shown *why* beings like classes are necessary; we are not left merely with the fact that they are necessary. Philosophy involves not just semantic ascent but presentational ascent.

Third, along a very different direction, G. E. L. Owen has provided an interpretation of Plato's *Sophist* which involves a special reading of the sense of the verb "is" in that dialogue. Owen's interpretation has been used by other scholars to explain the sense of "is" in other Greek thinkers. He claims that the verb "is" should not be taken in an existentialist way in the *Sophist*; Plato does not ask whether or not a thing or form exists, as opposed to its not existing at all, when he explores whether or not a certain subject "is." Rather, the question whether or not something is, is an elliptical formulation for the question whether or not that subject is characterized in some way or other. Plato uses not an existential "is" but a copulative "is," a word used to feature the subject in some way or other. Owen writes, "For Plato, *to be is to be something*." Now I would like to say
that this implies that, for Plato, to be is to be presentable in a certain way. Predicates or features are ways in which things are presentable. Owen's interpretation is not very much different from that of Heidegger, who, moving on from Husserl's base, equates the Greek sense of being with the sense of presencing.

My fourth and last topic deals with the concept of tokens as they are described by Peirce. In giving an example of a token, Peirce mentions "this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book." He tries to narrow a token to a particular instance of a word in one copy of one book, but he fails to narrow it down to a single particular reading by someone of that passage in that copy. The actual presentation or achievement of the word is overlooked, even though Peirce had mentioned, in the lines before the phrase cited above, that a token is an event at a particular instant of time. To handle this ultimate tokening would require an exploration of the kinds of presences and absences and identities that are appropriate to time and to our awareness of time, and it would involve the issue of our own identity through time. Husserl's treatment of inner time consciousness provides us with several layers of distinctions for exploring the special character of linguistic and symbolic tokening.

This random assortment of topics in American and British philosophy is meant to show how Husserl's way of doing philosophy brings a dimension of explanation that is important to but neglected by writers like Kripke, Donnellan, Quine, Owen, and Peirce.

V. The Concept of Philosophy

In the last part of this article I will examine what it means to do philosophy as Husserl does it, as the explanation of presencing, the classification of various kinds of presences and absences, and the description of various identities constituted in such presences and absences. What do we do and what are we talking about when we carry out analyses of predication, of categorial intuition, of recognition, as we did earlier in this article? When we do philosophy, we make presencing present in a new way. Philosophy does not initiate our awareness of presences, however; before we do philosophy, presences are at work in our natural experience of things, in our predications and other linguistic activities, in our appreciation of pictures, in our memories, and the like. Philosophy describes and classifies what is at work before it—philosophy—comes on the scene. What philosophy describes and classifies, however, is not
simply another segment of the world, like one more species of animal or another form of social organization. The patterns of presences and absences are what establish us as users of language, as conscious selves, and as agents who can understand our situation and initiate changes in it. The patterns of presence and absence establish us as datives of manifestation and permit the emergence of the human estate.

The peculiar status of presencing in all its various kinds is brought out if we ask what it would mean to say that we learn to remember, that we learn to see some things as pictures, that we learn to compare things, that we learn to see the same object in many appearances, or that we learn to call things by name. We may try to improve our memory, or we may learn to remember melodies, but we do not go about learning to remember purely and simply. Remembering and all the other forms of presentation have to come about in us to let us try to learn anything. When they come about in us, they permit us to be human. The forms of presentation are the same for everyone, and they are interrelated with one another.

Furthermore, the philosophical description of presencing is not just an anthropology. It is an inquiry into being. It is the exploration of how things present themselves, how they can be referred to in their absence, and how the identities of things are made manifest. But does this not imply that things are mere aggregates of phenomena, and does it not make philosophy into a kind of Berkeleyian idealism? It does not, and thinking that it does is caused by a mistaken notion of what presencing is, as well as by a mistaken notion of the stance or viewpoint from which we do philosophy. Someone who drew this Berkeleyian conclusion would think that in doing philosophy we somehow enter into competition with our prephilosophical experience of things, that we somehow tell our prephilosophical selves that the things we experience are not truly real but “only” appearances. But philosophy does not pull the rug from under ordinary experience in this way. What we find to be true and real in our perceptions, our arts, and our sciences is acknowledged as true by philosophy, which simply explores how such things are manifest and meant as true and real. Appearances are not equal to illusions or phantasies; what is true and real also seems to be true and real, and it is this seeming, as well as the seeming of illusions, pictures, memories, and the rest, that philosophy describes and classifies. Philosophy only works by quoting, so to speak, the prephilosophical, and by presenting, from a new and special angle, what was already present in the prephilosophical.
Philosophy speaks about things as presented and as meant in natural experience. Indeed, philosophy enters into conflict with the prephilosophical primarily by correcting the tendency of the prephilosophical to go beyond itself and to deny the being of appearances, of presences and absences. Our natural languages are geared to talking about things and their features. We are inclined to see everything except verified things and features as mere subjective viewpoints or illusions, and we forget that true things and features also appear as true things and features, and they are as they appear. Philosophy's work is to acknowledge, describe, and classify the presencings that work in the verification of things and their attributes. The truth of things is implicated in the being of things, and in exploring how things appear we also explore how they are.

I would like to add, parenthetically, that the remarks I am now making are not a description or classification of presences. They are an argument acknowledging presences, a discourse that attempts to establish how presences can be said to be. If the classification and description of presences, like what was done in the first part of this article, are to be called philosophy, then what we are doing now ought to be called first philosophy, the study not of kinds of presences but of presences as presences, or of being as being. Husserl develops this material in his theory of the phenomenological reduction, in his so-called fundamental phenomenological meditation in Ideas I, and in what he sometimes calls "the phenomenology of phenomenology," as it is developed in the second volume of First Philosophy. There are more than nominal affinities between Husserl's argument and Aristotle's science of being as being. For Aristotle too the substance of a thing is not that which makes it exist as opposed to not existing but that which is the center of intelligibility, necessity, and manifestation in the thing. The reason why Heidegger was so impressed by the conjunction of Husserl's Logical Investigations and Brentano's treatise on being in Aristotle is that Husserl's philosophy picks up and refreshes the question of being as it was formulated in the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle. The legitimacy of involving presencing with being, however, which Greek thinkers could take for granted, had to be critically reestablished by Husserl after the separation of mind from being in the philosophies of recent times.
NOTES

2 Ibid. Investigation 6, sec 51
3 Ibid. Investigation 6, sec 44.
5 The topic of empty intentions and fulfillments is explored by Husserl in sec 1 of Investigation 6, secs. 1–39 The issue is first introduced in Investigation 1, secs 9–10 See Robert Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations (Evanston, Ill : Northwestern University Press, 1974), secs 5–9.
6 Logical Investigations, Investigation 6, sec 47, p 791; translation slightly modified
8 I should perhaps add that the predication I have described is something more primitive than classification. I have described how a feature emerges and is acknowledged as an attribute; in classification we go around with a characteristic in mind and look for instances of it. Classification is more developed as an activity than is simple predication, and it presupposes simple predication. To analyze classification would call for more refinements than we have made so far.
9 Logical Investigations, Investigation 6, secs 6–8 On proper names see Investigation 6, sec 5, pp. 684–85
12 See Word and Object, sec 55
13 Ibid., sec 56; Gilbert Harman, “Quine on Meaning and Existence, II,” Review of Metaphysics 21 (1967): 356–62 After saying that Quine’s ontology admits both bits of matter and classes, Harman asks why Quine does not also eliminate material things as values of variables, since they too seem reducible to classes (“to the classes of points they contain’,” “to be classes of their space-time points,” pp 363–367) This “pure ontology of classes” (p 367) would have a curious likeness to Husserl’s notion of phenomenology as the description of appearances, with even material things taken in their condition as appearing
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