
As an ensemble piece this volume is outstanding, and no one with even a mild interest in Aristotle's *De Anima* will want to be without it. The individual pieces are without exception worthwhile and interesting, and some of them are exceptionally good (as I find, for instance, the chapters by Code and Moravcsik or Kahn), though the inclusion of the magisterial Brentano affords a glimpse of the higher standard often unmet today or here. The whole, however, and what it achieves is greater than the parts considered individually. The Introduction gathers information of a kind about the text, its transmission, and the history of its interpretation which ought to be a starting point for any serious study of the *De Anima*, but frequently is not. Then at least two principles of organization run through the rest of the volume. First, the order of themes in the *De Anima* itself is observed from the opening dialectical book (with the much-needed piece by Witt) to the closing section on animal motion and desire. All major themes are considered, though *De Anima* 3.9–13, ably served by Richardson and comments by others passim, as usual fails to receive enough of its due. Second, the article by Burnyeat, finally printed for all to see, sets an agenda for much of the volume. This piece, which argues that Aristotle involves no physiological change in his account of sense perception, galvanizes much of the whole. Most other authors feel compelled to weigh in regarding Burnyeat's argument, whose implications transcend the already fundamental issues concerning perception itself. As they describe their own task Nussbaum and Putnam arm for battle against it; Sorabji is brought to
refine and clarify his previous work; Kahn brings his usual measured and
thoughtful perspective to Aristotle's non-Cartesianism.

Burnyeat's article with its new way of thinking typifies what is so good
about this volume. There is an abundance of fresh ideas, new
approaches to old problems, and reassessment going on with respect to
the De Anima, not only regarding his so-called philosophy of mind, but
in all sorts of directions. A number of articles concern Aristotle's con-
ception of life and life forms, and a good article on the sense of touch,
which Freeland provides, is overdue. There is a vitality of interpretation
in the volume, as befits one on De Anima, whatever its shortcomings
and limitations.

There are, indeed, shortcomings and limitations, which go beyond dis-
agreements with the positions taken. One worth noting here is a general
narrowness of vision. As their citations show, many of the contributo-
s are involved in discussion with a rather small and like-minded circle of
scholarly peers, almost all of whom are writing in English. It is instruc-
tive to study the Bibliography which (with some mistakes) distinguishes
entries cited by the contributors in their articles from those added by
the editors and their assistant. Such a study shows how much literature
of genuine worth is left unconsidered or underappreciated in the dis-
cussions of the volume. One example from the start of the book makes
the point. In the Introduction Nussbaum says that an adequate study
of the extant manuscripts of the De Anima remains to be done and notes
that Ross's "De Anima work" (presumably both his 1956 O.C.T. edition
and his 1961 commentary edition) is "the most complete account of the
manuscripts we have" (p. 2). This is not true. Her own Bibliography
cites and tags as unconsidered in the volume the definitive study of Paul
Siwek, Le "De Anima" d'Aristote dans les manuscrits grecs (Vatican
City, 1965). Even worse, it fails to list his superior edition, Tractatus
De Anima (Rome, 1965), which is based on 65 manuscripts in 9 families
(compared to the 10 De Anima manuscripts [or 11, if e is distinguished
from E] used by Ross). This narrowness is a problem, no doubt, but
the lively and engaging consideration of new ideas and new directions
found throughout this large and important collection shows (as do the
fairly recent monographs of Modrak and Wedin) that scholarship on the
De Anima is more alive than it has been in some time, and encourages
the hope of a broader and more inclusive consideration and comprehen-
sion of Aristotle's positions in the De Anima to come.—Kurt Pritzl, The
Catholic University of America.

O'MEARA, Dominic J. Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993. ix + 142 pp. $39.95—It is difficult to
imagine a major philosopher more in need of introduction than Plotinus,
nor one whose thought is so deeply resistant to summary treatment.
O'Meara succeeds by awakening the beginner's interest in his subject
and reminding the specialist why it is so fascinating. First we are fa-
miliarized with the details of Plotinus's life, the diverse influences upon