How Knowing the World Completes the World: A Note on Aquinas and Husserl

by John C. McCarthy

I

When the Lord asked Job whether it was by Job’s wisdom that the hawk soars, He did not require an answer. As Thomas Aquinas explains, “God’s interrogation is not for the sake of instructing man but to convince him of his ignorance.” God’s questions were to show Job, and us, “that man is able to attain neither divine wisdom nor divine power.” In short, the Lord reminds His creature of His place. Surely it is just such an awareness of place that has led students of Thomas to object so vigorously to “idealism” in its myriad forms. For if it is true that the idealist supposes that his thinking holds the birds aloft, then he is guilty not just of error but of dangerous presumption. The Thomistic counter to all idealistic misconstruals of the relation between mind and world is commonly termed “realism” (although the word does not belong to Thomas’s own vocabulary). Much as Job dismissed the vain consolations of his human interlocutors so have the proponents of “Thomistic realism” dealt with the idealists.

Maritain’s assessment of Husserl is a case in point. In our century no philosopher has embraced the banner of idealism with quite the determination of Husserl. It is true that the founder of phenomenology had published a decisive refutation of psychologistic subjectivism at the turn of the century in his “Prolegomena to Pure Logic.” Yet in what appeared to many to be a stunning reversal, by 1913 he had come to present his own position as “transcendental phenomenological idealism.” And despite the frequent complaints of students, friends, and critics he would offer no public retraction of this self-characterization for the remaining 25 years of his life. Accordingly, in his penultimate “introduction” to phenomenology, the Cartesian Meditations (1929), Husserl would write: “the being of the pure ego and his cogitations, as a being that is prior in itself, is antecedent to the natural being of the world.” It was to be expected, then, that Maritain should describe this book, and therewith phenomenology as a whole, as “the very epitome of
presumption in the matter of human knowing. Not long ago Anton Pegis took up the case against Husserl once again. While Pegis may have greeted Husserl’s project with greater sympathy, he ultimately concurred with Maritain that Husserl flagrantly disregards the primacy of the world over the mind. The same charge has been made by other distinguished readers of Thomas.9

Although a few commentators have argued for important affinities between Thomas and Husserl,10 Husserl’s idealism remains a stumbling block for many. Yet it could be shown that Husserl’s realist critics have misunderstood the meaning of phenomenology’s intentions. Husserl was perfectly aware of the danger of solipsism; indeed, he held phenomenology to be the decisive refutation of that cardinal error.10 His several attempts at an “introduction” to phenomenology can in large measure be seen as a response to those who confused the phenomenological stance with an unhealthy subjectivism. What is more, it appears that he did in the end abandon the tag “idealism” as inadequate to his purposes.11 In sum, and as numerous able expositors have made clear, Husserl’s account of subjectivity in no way subverts the being or nature of the transcendent world.12 As regards phenomenology at least, the alternatives “realism” and “idealism” prove to conceal more than they disclose.

In what follows, however, I shall not essay a sketch of phenomenology. Rather, I should like to call attention to some texts from the work of Thomas that might help prepare a more welcome reception for Husserl. These texts suggest that there is substantial agreement between the two thinkers about the very thing alleged to be the crux of the dispute between them. We begin by examining a chapter from Book II of the Summa contra gentiles. The nerve of that chapter would seem clear enough: knowing the world in some way completes the world. Yet that thesis appears to conflict with a central and abiding tenet of Thomas’s account of the nature of human knowledge, namely, that the known is a perfection of the knower. This difficulty leads us to a passage from the De veritate, on the basis of which the apparent contradiction will be resolved and the results of our exegesis confirmed. The upshot of our investigation may be simply stated. For Thomas as for Husserl, the act of knowing can, paradoxically, be said to be constitutive of the whole of which the knowing agent forms a part.

II

In Summa contra gentiles II, c. 46 Thomas defends a most striking proposition: “the perfection of the universe requires that there be some intellectual creatures.”18 From the context, it is clear that Thomas does not only have human beings in mind, but neither does he offer us any reason to suppose that he is targeting angelic beings in particular. The theme of the chapter is a formal one, namely, created intellectuality as such. It should also go without saying that the “perfection of the universe” is not equivalent to the philosophical conceit that this is “the best of all possible worlds.” On a Thomistic understanding the Leibnizian formula is a contradiction in terms. The infinite distance between ipsum esse subsistens and created esse means that no world could possibly be “best.”14 Beginning not with unimaginable possibilities but with the manifest fact that the universe is inhabited by intelligent beings, the chapter seeks to persuade us that created intellectuality provides strong evidence that the universe is, literally, perfectum, made thoroughly.15

Supporting the reasoning of the chapter are two very Aristotelian principles, spelled out in detail in the immediately preceding chapters. According to the first, “the good of the whole is better than the good of the single part.”16 According to the second, the good of the whole “consists in the mutual ordering of the parts.”17 Let us ponder for a moment the terms “whole” and “part.” As Oliva Blanchette has noted, by “parts” Thomas here means primarily the various kinds of beings inhabiting the universe, and only incidentally the particular creatures constituting those kinds at any given time.18 Furthermore, the good arising from the ordering of kinds far from obliterating all local teleology, positively requires that each kind has its own integrity, and therewith, its own purpose.19 As for the whole which is home to these parts, Thomas seems to consider it self-evident that the universe is an orchestrated arrangement and no heap. It follows that the good of the universe is not additive merely; it is not simply the sum of all individual goods. This in turn justifies his claim that the world’s goodness is superior to that of its parts, and not just more of the same.

What c. 46 seeks to show, then, is that for the universe to be a whole, and hence to be wholly good, some parts of it must enjoy intellectuality. In some way, the presence of intellectual beings in the universe is to secure the whole goodness of the universe. From all of this two things would seem to follow. In the first place, while the logic of an ordered whole dictates that sub-intellectual creatures have their own being, nevertheless their being as parts of a perfect whole will, presumably, be actualized only by virtue of intellect. Intellectual creatures must realize the goodness of non-thinking substances precisely qua parts of the whole while leaving the proper goods of such parts intact. Secondly, we should distinguish at least formally the particular good of intellectual substances and the universal good realized through them. Although the striving of an intellectual being to realize his or her own fulfillment through the act of knowing the whole will coincide with the whole’s becoming a completed whole, nevertheless these two achievements must be kept distinct.

Before we examine c. 46 in some detail we should note the absence there of an argument Thomas makes in similar circumstances elsewhere. In Summa contra gentiles II, c. 91, for example, Thomas aims to show “that there are some intellectual substances not united to bodies.”20 One way he does this hinges on the premise that “all possible
natures are found in the order of things; for otherwise the universe would be imperfect. In other words, the world would not be complete were it to suffer notable gaps in its kinds. Now it might appear that this premise serves the concerns of c. 46 equally well. In fact, it contributes nothing to our understanding of what intellectual substances as such contribute to the perfection of the universe, for it vindicates the existence of any and all possible substances. The argument of c. 91 is not used in c. 46 because, as we shall see, the place of mind in the world order proves to be far more strategic than the simple actualization of one ontological possibility among many.

Our chapter advances a series of arguments. Each evinces Thomas's not unreasonable conviction that intellectual creatures occupy the apex of creation. Thomas opens the discussion by voicing a principle controlling the entire chapter: "an effect is most perfect when it returns to its origin." Hence the circle is the most perfect of figures, and circular motion the most complete of motions. But how is the whole of creation to "return" to its source? In a word, through imitation. "[E]ach single creature and all creatures together return to their origin insofar as they bear a likeness to their origin." Plainly we must be prepared to stretch our everyday sense of the word "return" if we are to understand the chapter. It may seem strange to us but for Thomas an effect returns to its origin in exactly the same way that it emanates from its origin, namely, by imaging it. In sum c. 46 proposes that intellectual creatures bring about a closure to the universe simply by their being like God.

Yet, is not a constant with Thomas that all effects necessarily imitate their cause? And does this not imply that every creature perfects the universe in some way? Indeed it does; in the passage just cited he says as much. However, it is the burden of the chapter to show that intellectual substances imitate their creator in a privileged fashion, thereby perfecting the created whole in a decisive way. For the more an effect resembles its agent cause, the more perfect is its return. Thus c. 46 does not claim that intellectual substances perfect a universe otherwise lacking in any perfection. The chapter argues, rather, that intellect rounds out an order already good.

The various arguments of the chapter highlight different senses in which intellectual creatures imitatively complete the universe. For example, in the first Thomas specifies that since God's intellect is "the principle of the production of creatures," therefore the very being and nature of intellectual substances constitutes an imitative return to the ground of all beings. The second argument is an extension of the first. Thomas there observes that the "consummate" perfection of the universe requires that some creatures return to their source not only by virtue of the special likeness of their nature, now called their "first perfection," but also by virtue of their "operation," which he terms their "second perfection." But this would be possible only through an act of intellect and will, for God has no other way of operating. Consequently, the completion of the universe requires that there be some actively intellect and willing creatures. The fourth and fifth arguments do not differ markedly from the first two, and for the sake of brevity we shall not discuss them here.

These arguments bring us to a question. Granted that the universe does not realize the imitative return of intellect (and with it willing) in its every part, why is this way of being and acting said to be the perfection of the created whole as such? Had Thomas not stressed that the good of the whole consists in its order, we might be inclined to conclude that creatures possessing intellect are essentially a pleasing ornament to creation, bettering the world simply by being better than the world. However, the notion of order would seem to demand a more intrinsic relation between that which intellects and that which does not. Consider again Thomas's use of circular motion as an example of perfection. One may speak here of a "return" because the one moving thing is restored to its starting point by a single continuous motion. If we are to take this example seriously it would appear that the intellectual part could perfect the whole only if in some way the whole and not merely the part were brought back to its origin in and through the part's imitation of God. Our question, then, comes to this: is there a sense in which the likeness of intellectual substances to God's being, nature and operation helps to realize the perfection of the entire universe and not just their own perfection? Otherwise stated, is there any way in which the sub-intellectual realm is ordered to created intellect?

As a first approach to the question let us consider the third argument of the chapter. There Thomas, looking back to the result of a previous chapter, asserts that there is in creation a more perfect likeness to God when there are not only good things, but things capable of contributing to the good of other things. As he puts it in chapter 45, "that which shines and illumines is more like the sun than that which merely shines"; and in the same place he describes such benefaction as occurring between agent and patient, and hence between superior and inferior. Chapter 46 adds that this "mode" of imitating God is possible only for creatures who understand and will. It would seem that with this argument the sub-intellectual realm is brought into relation with intellectuality. Thomas would appear to be suggesting that being the object of knowing and willing is good for that which cannot itself will or know. A difficulty with the argument, however, is that Thomas does not specify the nature of the intelligent action he has in mind. The solar analogy of the preceding chapter, while suggestive, does not entitle us to draw any firm conclusions.

The last argument of the chapter, the only one to raise the issue of order explicitly, provides a fuller answer to our question. It begins as follows.

In all things becomingly ordered the relation of secondary terms to the ultimate term imitates the relation of the first
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to all the others, both first and last, although sometimes
deficiently. Now it has been shown that God comprehends in
Himself all creatures. And this is represented in corporeal
creatures, although in another way. For the superior body is
always found comprehending and containing the inferior, but
according to quantitative extension, while God contains all
creatures in a simple way and not by quantitative extension.

To limit ourselves to a geometrical example, the line contains the point,
the plane the line, and the cube the plane, but God comprehends all
these areas — and indeed the whole of creation — without Himself
being an extended quantity. The argument continues:

in order that the imitation of God in this way of containing
not be lacking to creatures, intellectual creatures were made
which contain corporeal creatures not by quantitative exten-
sion but simply by way of understanding: for what is under-
stood is in the one understanding and is comprehended by his
intellectual operation. 30

In other words, the way the whole universe is comprehended by the
divine intellect is imaged in the way the sub-intellectual world
is understood by creative intelligence. Elsewhere, of course, Thomas char-
acterizes the intellect’s grasp of the corporeal in a non-extended way as
its “inmateriollity.” With this final argument, then, it becomes clear
that for the author of the Summa contra gentiles the perfection of the
whole achieved by intellectual creatures does indeed involve all parts of
the whole. The whole world participates in the intellectual substance’s
imitation of the divine.

In effect the last argument of c. 46 restates Aristotle’s dictum that
“the soul is in a way all the beings” 31 while further specifying the nature of
that “way.” In intellectual creatures the whole corporeal order under-
goes an uplift, a sublation. Worldly knowing takes the world up into
itself without compromising either the being of the things known or the
intellect’s immaterial nature. As Thomas will say only a few chapters on,
“the forms of sensible things have a more perfect esse in the intellect
than in sensible things.” 32 Hence, somewhat paradoxically, the pres-
ence of intellectual creatures in the world allows the world as a whole to
imitate the relation between the world and its non-worldly origin.
That part of the whole constituted by intellect perfects the whole from
within by bringing the whole back to its beginnings, and this by imaging
with the greatest possible fidelity the whole’s own imaging of its origins.
In knowing a material creature, intellectual substance images a divine
image precisely as image, and in this way images something of its origin
as origin. Short of denying that the world has an origin, one is hard
pressed to imagine how the world could be more complete. Admittedly,
no human intellect, nor all human intellects together, could ever ade-

quately comprehend the universe; indeed, not even angelic intel-
lect comprehends the created whole as does its creator. In this respect, all
created intellect is essentially partial or imperfect. 33 Nevertheless,
to that extent that they do know the world precisely insofar as it is a
world, created intellects bring a closure to it. Once thinking arrives on
the scene there would, at least in principle, seem to be nothing else for
the universe to achieve. 34

At this juncture we must confront a serious obstacle to our inter-
pretation. In numerous other texts Thomas insists that the act of knowing
is a completion of the knower and not of the thing known. Adept student
of Aristotle that he was, Thomas consistently held that the thing known
does not undergo any change in being known: knowing is a perfection
of the knower. Consider, for example, the following passage from De
veritate.

Knowledge depends upon the knowable, but the converse
does not obtain; whence the relation by which knowledge is
referred to the knowable is real, but the relation by which the
knowable is referred to knowledge is of reason merely...and
thus is it in all things which stand to one another as measure
and measured, or that which perfects and that which is
perfected. 35

In a still more pointed text from the Summa theologiae Thomas writes:

The human act of understanding is not the act and perfection
of the material nature understood, as though it were possible
to understand in one act the nature of the material thing and
the act of understanding. 36

The reasoning behind these passages is not hard to discern. If the act
of knowing were the immediate perfection of the thing known it would
ultimately be impossible to distinguish the world from intellectual
activity. This would mean in turn that the mind could never know
anything apart from itself, or rather that the mind could not be said to
“know” anything at all, for whatever appeared to it to be true would
necessarily be “true.” 37 In short, as much for the integrity of knowledge
as for the integrity of the world it is essential to distinguish the
perfection of the intellect from the perfection of its object, and to root
the former in the latter. That said, what becomes of the argument of
Summa contra gentiles II, c. 46?

A second text from De veritate — q. 2, a. 2 — is indispensable in
addressing this difficulty. 38

In it Thomas distinguishes two ways in which created things are
perfected. According to the first, a thing is perfected through the esse
which pertains to it by virtue of its species or kind. In this sense a thing
is realized or completed by its essence and, more fundamentally, by its
act of being. But, Thomas continues,

since the specific esse of one thing is distinct from the specific esse of another thing, therefore in any created thing of this kind the perfection in each single thing falls short of perfection simply speaking to the degree that perfection is found in other species.

So, for example, to exist as an otter means in part not to possess the being of an egret, and thus to lack its specifically avian perfection. Consequently, this first sort of perfection, stemming from the esse proper to the thing, is an "imperfect" or incomplete perfection. As Thomas puts it

the perfection of any thing considered in itself is imperfect as being a part of the perfection of the whole universe, which arises from the perfection of single things assembled together [invicem congregatis].

The particular thing, then, finds the fullness of perfection outside itself in its participation in the created gathering of kinds. Having said this, Thomas goes on to describe a "remedy" for the limited perfection of particular kinds of beings.

[In order that there be some remedy for this imperfection another mode of perfection is found in created things according to which the perfection which is proper to one thing is found in another thing: and this is the perfection of the knower insofar as he is knowing, because something is known by the knower according to this, namely, that the known thing itself is in some way in the knower.

That Thomas should think any "remedy" necessary is telling. Why should the simple being together of all existing kinds not suffice to complete the imperfections of any single one? From this passage it is clear at any rate that for Thomas what we might call the "extrinsic" perfection of order is completed only if it be drawn into some single being. Accordingly, he goes on to cite a text from De anima already familiar to us, and concludes that by virtue of the soul’s power in some way to become all things "it is possible that the perfection of the universe exist in one thing," from which it follows that the perfection of the knower and the perfection of the universe coincide.

While the passage is admittedly a difficult one, it does shed light on our problem. For it allows us to see that while knowing does not perfect the known thing in its kindness, still less in its act of existing, nevertheless there is a way, albeit a roundabout way, in which knowing brings the known to completion. Besides its particular limited perfec-


tion, each thing in the universe enjoys a perfection outside itself by contributing to and thereby participating in the order of the universe. In the knower that perfection, diffused over space and time, is gathered into one in his or her act of knowing. Intellect makes manifest what lies scattered, fragmentary and hidden, among all the particulars of the world, namely, that together they form a world, a cosmic whole. In this way the whole qua whole and by extension the part qua part are perfected by intellection. This, as we have seen, is precisely the suggestion of Summa contra gentiles II, c. 46. Such perfection in no way compromises a thing’s first perfection, the perfection it possesses within itself by virtue of its specific act of existence. To the contrary, intellect, in letting the truth appear, lets things be precisely what they are. We may conclude, therefore, that while the knower is in one respect perfected by the thing known, nevertheless in another respect it is the thing known which is perfected by the knower.

In fine, should we look to the created whole, then plainly, for Thomas, intellectual beings do not simply occupy a place alongside all the other beings. Knowing the world is not merely an addendum to the world, a perfection of the knowing part but a matter of indifference to the known world. Thinking, in a word, is not itself an afterthought. Intellectual activity, if it is true to its calling, is a validation of the wholeness of the world. We might say that it verifies the worldhood of the world. Thus while Thomas would never allow that the existence of the world is defined exclusively with respect to its being known, as might some "idealists," he does teach that sub-intellectual creatures are ordained in their being to their being thought about. Their being and their good is not separable from, not wholly prior to, the good of their being known. It should come as no surprise, then, that in subsequent chapters of Summa contra gentiles Thomas will not hesitate to say that the entire sub-human creation exists for the sake of human beings. A decisive aspect of Thomas’s “realism” is his conviction that intellectual substances are both cause and effect of the intelligible order, in the world but not of it.

To conclude, a few words about Husserlian phenomenology are in order. Husserl might be said to begin with the paradoxical inadequacy of ordinary talk about the relation between thinking and the world. We tend to suppose ourselves as “in” the world, and the world as “outside” of our thoughts; but if pressed we will allow that the world is also somehow “in” our thoughts, and that our thinking reaches “outside” the mind to be with the world we think. In short, spatial prepositions, drawn from our experience of the world, are quite inadequate to account for the mind’s relation to the world. Yet rather than think through this paradox we are in Husserl’s reckoning inclined to reduce the intellect to a mere “tag-end” of the world, and intellection is taken to be just another
worldly occurrence, whether "physical" or "psychological," it scarcely matters which. What this means is that ordinary life and even ordinary science rarely wonders that the world should be "there" for us, that it is available to be thought about, that the very transcendence of the world is disclosed to us. In this sense, Husserl thinks that we take the existence of the world for granted. Not that Husserl ever once doubts the world’s existence, or supposes that our being in the world required philosophic corroboration. His self-appointed task is, rather, to clarify how it is that being is manifested without begging the question i.e., without simply appealing to just another being. Transcendental phenomenology is the result of the need to get "beyond" beings in order to appreciate their being as beings or their being as true. Without supposing that the world is derived from consciousness, phenomenology argues that it cannot finally be conceived without reference to its being disclosed, that the world’s manifestation is a possibility belonging to the world. Consequently, the full realization of the world requires that it be made manifest to, for, and by the knowing agent. In this respect the universe is dependent upon the knower. Having seen this, phenomenology undertakes to articulate the ongoing achievement of the world’s disclosure, to describe with all possible precision and with a keen sense of the enormity of the task, how it is that we come to have a world.

For Husserl as for Thomas, then, intellection completes the world. To be sure, nothing is gained by papering over differences between these two. That the world owes its existence to God’s creative activity is perhaps the overarching theme of Thomas’s philosophizing, whereas Husserl says next to nothing about creation in this sense; indeed, Husserl abjures, or at least postpones indefinitely, all cosmological investigation. Thus their accounts are cast in rather different terms. Furthermore, Husserl investigates the mind’s “constitution” of the world at great length while Thomas seems to discuss this theme almost only in passing. But then the philosophical legacy bequeathed to Husserl differed markedly from Thomas’s. Hence even students of Thomas have, in our time, thought it necessary to confront the modern or Cartesian turn to the “subject.” And in any case, Husserl was surely right to insist that the manifestation of the world “in” our thinking is truly a wonder to which we may profitably return again and again. Nothing prevents us, then, from regarding the two accounts as complementary. To sum up, students of Thomas have, I believe, little to fear from Husserl’s phenomenology. As I have tried to argue, that the mind is in some sense prior to the world needs not be regarded as an unfortunate modern divergence from medieval wisdom. For if Thomas is rightly characterized as a “realist” it is, in part, because he had anticipated the truth of “idealism.”

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Husserl refers to "the transcendental illusion that from the outset misleads, and usually paralyzes, any attempt to start a consistent transcendental philosophy: the illusion that such a philosophy must lead to a transcendental solipsism." *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), §96b, 241; cf., §§65-67, 169-74; §99, 250-55.


13. *Summa contra gentiles* (SCG) II 46 (13:374): "Quod oportet ad perfectionem universi aliquid creaturarum intellectuales esse." Current philosophical usage generally employs the terms "universe" and "world" interchangeably, and I have done so in this essay. To the best of my knowledge chapter 46 has no close parallel in other works of Thomas. Note, too, that the chapter is somewhat unusual in that it contains no references, neither to Scripture, nor to the theologians, nor to the philosophers.

14. Cf., Oliva Blanchette, *The Perfection of the Universe According to Aquinas: A Teleological Cosmology* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 134. This fine study, which examines many of the passages I consider here, came to my attention after the present essay was substantially completed.

15. To situate the text within Book II as a whole, c. 46 forms a bridge between the preceding six chapters, which had considered the fact that creation is not monolithic but involves a distinction among things created, and the remainder of the book, which highlights the nature and place of intellectual substances in creation.


19. As Thomas shows at length in c. 45, the good of the whole is brought about in and through a formal and material diversity of goods. "Plura bona uno bono finito sunt meliora . . ." (13:372); cf., ST I, 22.4, c (4:289); 55.2, c (6:156).

20. "Quod sunt aliae substantiae intellectuales corporibus non unitae" (13:652).

21. "Omnes autem naturae possibiles in rerum ordine inveniuntur: alter
being can be both known and known, and this leads to the discussion we cite here.

39. "Seipsum igitur est quod rex altius inventur perfecta dupllicit. Uno modo secundum perfectionem sui esse quod ei competit secundum propriam speciem. Sed quia esse specificum unius rei est distinctum ab esse specifico alterius rei, ideo in qualibet re creata hiusmodi perfectio in uniusque re tantum deest de perfectione simpliciter quantum perfectionis in speciebus alicum inventur, ut sic cuiuslibet rei perfecta in se considerata sit imperfecta veluti pars perfectionis totius universi, quae consurgit ex singularum rerum perfectionibus invicem congregatis. Unde ut hic imperfectione aliquod remedium esse inventur alicus modo perfectionis in rebus creatis secundum quod perfectio quae est propria unius rei in re altera inventur: et haece est perfectio cognoscentis in quantum quod cognoscens quae secundum hoc a cognoscente alicui cognosciuntur quod ipsum cognitum est aliquo modo epud cognoscentem; et ideo in III De anima discitur 'anima esse quodam modo omnia' quia nata est omnis cognoscere; et secundum hunc modum possibile est ut in una re totius universi imperfecto existat" (22:144). Note that the argument goes on to describe two ways in which this unifying perfection is realized, (i) through the philosopher's investigation of the order and causes of the world, and (ii) through the elevated soul's vision of the world: "unde haec est ultima perfectio ad quam anima potest pervenire secundum philosophos ut in ea describatur totus ordo universi et causarum eius, in quo etiam finem ultimum hominis posuerunt, quod secundum nos erit in visione Dei qui secundum Gregorium 'quid est quod non vident quin videntem omnia vident?'" See Blanchette's discussion of this page: The Perfection of the Universe, 270-75.

40. De Finance stresses the active character of that participation, involving as it does each particular thing's being as a cause of other things. Cf., Etre et agir, 244, 316. Yet while one could say that through a chain of causality everything in the universe is in a sense 'implicated' in everything else, aside from intellect, no particular cause extends in its own operation to the whole.

41. In his interpretation of DV 2, 2 Blanchette cites a text from SCG II, 50, which we have referred to earlier (cf., n. 32 above). This passage describes the imperfection pertaining to non-intellectual creatures qua materially and hence numerically diverse, which is the imperfection emphasized by Blanchette. However, he also directs us to ST 11.14.1 (4:166): "considerandum est quod cognoscit a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentis nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum; sed cognoscentes naturam habent formam etiam rei alterius, nam species cogniti est in cognoscente. Unde manifestum est quod natura rei non cognoscentis est magis coepta et limitata: natura autem rerum cognoscentium habet maiorem amplitudinem et extensionem." This passage calls attention to the formally limited imperfection of material substances; and it is this which is surely the principal concern of our text from DV 2, 2. However that may be, both sorts of limitations are surely relevant to the question of how it is that the soul perfects the universe. Cf., The Perfection of the Universe, 268-75, and ST 11.1-II, 133.2 (10:446).

42. Cf., de Finance, Etre et agir, 317: an intellectual substance is such that
one cannot consider it "simpliciter comme partie de l'univers."

43. Cf. SCG II, 40 (13:860) with III, 78 (14:269); IV, 66 (15:178); 97 (15:298) and especially III, 112 (14:856), of which the following passage is representative: "Sicut agitur unumquodque cursu naturae, ita natum est agi. Sic autem videmus res cursu naturae currere quod substantia intellectalis omnibus allis utilitur propter se: vel ad intellectus perfectionem, quia in eis veritatem speculatur; vel ad suae virtutis executionem et scientiae explicationem, ad modum quo artifex explicat artis suae conceptionem in materia corporali; vel etiam ad corporis sustentationem, quod est unitum animae intellectuali, sicut in hominibus patet."

44. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations §10, 24.
45. Husserl, Ideas, First Book §80, 56ff.; also Cartesian Meditations §62, 151.
46. Cf., ibid., §84, 200; §87, 2:2.
47. I am grateful to David Gallagher, Andrew Murray, Gregory Reichberg and Kevin White for their comments on earlier drafts of this essay.

Friedrich Nietzsche and Ludwig Feuerbach were easily the two most notorious atheists of the 19th century. Yet the possible influence of Feuerbach upon Nietzsche has been little noted, either by contemporary scholarship or by Nietzsche himself. Nietzsche's only published reference to Feuerbach notes Feuerbach's influence on Wagner, not on himself. Still, there are passages throughout Nietzsche's writings that unmistakably echo Feuerbach, suggesting that a more indirect influence did take place. Nietzsche's familiarity with German culture further supports the idea that he had, at a minimum assimilated the gist of Feuerbach's thought.

My aim is not to present Nietzsche as the intellectual heir of Feuerbach, but instead to gain insight into a fundamental dimension of Nietzsche's own thought by showing how it can be read as a departure from and radicalization of Feuerbach. I intend to pursue this difference by focusing on the metaphors of waking and dreaming in the thought of both, contrasting what I will call Nietzsche's "imperative to dream" with Feuerbach's "imperative to awake." I also wish to explore the possibility that the difference between Feuerbach and Nietzsche on the issue of waking and dreaming runs roughly parallel to the difference between modernity and postmodernity. If that is so, then the Feuerbach/Nietzsche break can provide a productive demarcation for these historical epochs.

"Religion," Feuerbach tells us, "is the dream of the human mind." Feuerbach's imperative calls on us to wake from our slumber, exit the splendor of our imagination, and enter instead "the simple daylight of reality." The opposition of waking and dreaming presented by Feuerbach is at the same time the opposition of truth and illusion. The dream of religion is identified with falsehood or error, and truth emerges when the illusions propagated by this dream are dispelled. By pursuing a strategy that pits truth against illusion, Feuerbach is an heir to that crystallization of modernity, the French Enlightenment. It was there that we encountered the optimism and brashness of a Condorcet, whose